By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On February 22, the President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev made an paid official trip visit to Moscow to discuss and sign a new declaration on allied cooperation with Russia. The visit came just a day after President Putin's infamous decision to recognize the independence of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk Peoples' Republic in Eastern Ukraine. President Vladimir Putin’s “unexpected” decision deteriorated relations with Ukraine, even more and was followed by the new round of economic sanctions imposed by the U.S and the EU.
President Aliyev's visit to Moscow triggered debates in Azerbaijan and Russia, respectively , on whether the main text of the declaration was pre-negotiated between the two leaders, or prepared amid the escalation around Ukraine. READ MORE

• February 28, 2022

By Alan WHITEHORN, Professor Emeritus in Political Science, The Royal Military College of Canada

Divide and conquer is a well-known historic aphorism for ambitious imperial states. Divide and control is a corollary. Since the break-up of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, Moscow’s geo-political and foreign policy has opted on a number of occasions to initiate or accentuate the splitting away of small fragments from somewhat weak newly independent states. In so doing, Moscow could more effectively re-assert some control over its historic ‘near abroad’ and re-extend its sphere of influence over parts of the former Soviet Union. Amongst the examples are: Transnistria splintering from Moldova in 1991, South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia in the early 1990s, and Donetsk and Luhansk from Ukraine in 2014. READ MORE

• February 28, 2022

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

Moscow and Beijing are likely to discover that their initial joy over the US withdrawal from Afghanistan may be premature. Afghanistan under the Taliban remains divided, insecure and uncertain about its current and future path. Without stability and security, neither Beijing nor Moscow will provide economic assistance while the international community will continue to shun Afghanistan.
Russia’s Presidential Envoy to Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, noted that “The Taliban were easier to negotiate with than the old “puppet government” of the exiled President Ashraf Ghani.” The latter was seen by, and from Moscow, as a puppet of the West and contacts that Russia maintained with Hamid Karzai’s successor were either downgraded or revised. At the same time, contacts between Russia and the Taliban only increased. With the West’s departure, Moscow is seizing up the opportunity indirectly to recognise the authority of the Taliban, which it officially designated as a terrorist organisation back in 2003 though without burning its bridges with the militant group. READ MORE.

• February 22, 2022

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Economic cooperation in the South Caucasus may bring lasting stability if vital interests are taken into account.
Regional economic cooperation in the South Caucasus has always been the focus of international organizations and external powers as a tangible way to stabilize the region and pave the way for conflict settlement. After the end of the first Karabakh war in 1994, in close cooperation with Turkey and under strong US support, Azerbaijan launched several regional infrastructure projects—oil and gas pipelines and railways connecting Azerbaijan with Turkey via Georgia. Azerbaijan and Turkey excluded Armenia from these projects and imposed an economic blockade, viewing this exclusion as a tool to force Armenia to give up Nagorno Karabakh. READ MORE

• February 22, 2022

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

Since its emergence in the 1980s, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) has been a significant source of concern to the state of Turkey. With the escalation of conflict between the Turkish state and the ethnic Kurdish community in the 1990s, the level of violence explicitly increased, and the civilian death toll rose to its highest point. Though the PKK could not ensure absolute authority in large, predominantly Kurdish provinces in the southeast, it gradually shifted to a new strategy —urban violence— to undermine the Turkish state's authority in Kurdish regions.
According to theories of violent resistance, violence is the only practical and productive tool of mass mobilisation of ethnic insurgencies against political systems. In the case of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, many scholars argue that Turkey's policy of ethnic nationalism has had a decisive role in shaping Kurdish ethnic nationalism throughout these years. READ MORE

• February 22, 2022

The head of the defensive alliance says Moscow is maintaining a massive force ready to attack Ukraine.

• February 16, 2022

Are Russian forces getting ready for war in Ukraine? At least 130,000 Russian troops are positioned within reach of Ukraine's borders as Russia demands security guarantees from the West.

• February 16, 2022

For Britons with ties to Ukraine, the current situation at its border is nerve-racking. While tensions have shown signs of de-escalation since some members of Russia's military withdrew, fears of an invasion have yet to subside.

• February 16, 2022