An open letter signed by people from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkey, and other countries

We, a group of people who stand for peace, from the post-Soviet space and its neighbourhood exhausted by never-ending wars and growing imperialist rivalry on our territories, are full of rage as we have observed Azerbaijan’s recent large-scale attack on Armenia. This, coupled with Russian Federation’s attack on Ukraine and the renewed military clashes in border areas between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, raises heavy concerns regarding possible future escalations not only in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict but all other conflicts in the post-Soviet space.
The recent attack on Armenia has costed hundreds of lives within two days from both sides of the conflict, caused serious destruction to civil infrastructure in Armenia, displaced thousands, and further widened the gap between the countries and their people. We raise our persistent voices against the continuing warfare. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On December 12, 2022, Azerbaijan blocked the Lachin corridor, the only route connecting the self-proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic with the outside world. The corridor is blocked by "eco–activists," who initially demanded access for the relevant Azerbaijani state institutions to monitor the copper-molybdenum mine in Nagorno Karabakh. They argued that Nagorno Karabakh authorities did not meet international standards. However, very soon, the list of demands started to increase – the resignation of the newly appointed state minister of the self-proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic, Ruben Vardanyan, and the establishment of an Azerbaijani checkpoint in the Lachin corridor were among the new demands added. Anyone, who has at least a basic understanding of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and has followed the developments there since the end of the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war, has no doubts that what has been going on in the Lachin corridor for almost a month is connected with geopolitics, rather than benign environmental concerns. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The trilateral statement of November 10, 2020, which ended the 2020 Karabakh war seemed to sideline the US and France, who with Russia had for decades co-chaired the OSCE Minsk Group, from involvement in any post-war conflict settlement arrangements. It established instead a Russian monopoly in mediating future arrangements in the region. Neither Washington nor France was involved in preparing the November 10 statement, while the deployment of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno Karabakh fomented the role of Russia as the only security provider for Nagorno Karabakh Armenians. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia signed another trilateral statement on January 11, 2021, focused on restoring communications. The leaders' November 26, 2021, summit aimed to promote a border delimitation and demarcation process. In late 2021, the West started taking small steps to re-insert itself in the negotiation process, with the President of the European Council organizing the first Aliyev – Pashinyan summit in Brussels. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On October 12, 2022, the White House published President Biden’s first national security strategy. The document outlines the US’ primary goals for domestic and foreign policy and its future vision for the world. US national security strategies have been published every four years since the early 2000s, laying out the incumbent administration’s policy goals and strategic priorities. The 2002 and 2006 national security strategies were focused on the war on terror and democracy promotion. The Obama administration, while emphasizing democracy promotion, started to refocus the US’ attention on the Asia-Pacific region. Meanwhile, due to the 2014 Ukraine crisis, the February 2015 national security strategy included harsh rhetoric toward Russia. In December 2017, President Donald Trump focused his national security strategy on great power competition and US rivalry with China READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Azerbaijan launched a new, large-scale aggression against Armenia on September 13, and the absence of tangible actions by the CSTO to stop Azerbaijan’s attacks have reinvigorated discussions in Armenia about the country’s potential withdrawal from the CSTO. This recent wave of public discontent in Armenia about the CSTO coincided with a visit to Armenia by U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, which added a geopolitical component to the discussions, given the complete rupture of relations between the United States and Russia. On the very day of Azerbaijan’s aggression, Armenia officially appealed to the CSTO, based on article 4 of the treaty, asking for support, including by military means. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Since April 2021, Iran and other signatories of the 2015 nuclear deal (commonly known as JCPoA) have been engaged in active negotiations to restore it. President Biden’s administration declared its intention to move forward in that direction almost immediately after coming to power in January 2021. Many representatives of the Obama administration, who were personally involved in the negotiations from 2013 to 2015, received new positions in the Biden administration, and their desire to restore what they achieved in 2015 was quite understandable. Besides personal motives, the two and half years of the “maximum pressure campaign” against Iran launched by President Trump did not bring any tangible results. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Almost every war, short or long, ends at the negotiation table. There are exceptions to this rule, like World War II, which ended with the capitulation of Nazi Germany and Japan. However, the capitulation of one side is an unlikely scenario for the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Azerbaijan suffered significant defeat during the first Karabakh war in the early 1990s but did not sign the capitulation. Armenia faced almost the same fate in 2020, and while Azerbaijan and some experts in Armenia argue that the November 10, 2020, trilateral statement was a capitulation for Armenia, there was no formal capitulation. Since the end of the 2020 Karabakh war, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been negotiating to reach a long-lasting solution. Russia, and since mid-2021, the EU have acted as primary mediators, organizing several high-level summits and hectic behind-the-scenes actions to facilitate the process. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

The “Great Game” was a political and diplomatic confrontation that existed for most of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century between the British Empire and the Russian Empire over Afghanistan and Central Asia, aiming to control trade routes in India. Almost a century later, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the “Game” returned, and a fierce competition arose between the Russians and the Americans and their Western allies to control the oil and gas fields and pipelines in the South Caucasus. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

Amid mounting domestic unrest and ongoing diplomatic standoffs with regional states, Iran has devoted a significant and increasing amount of national resources toward upgrading its national drone program. On May 17, the Iranian government officially inaugurated its first overseas drone factory in Dushanbe, Tajikistan; the facility manufactures the indigenous Ababil-2, a multipurpose drone model with reconnaissance, combat, and suicide capabilities. The Ababil-2 boasts a maximum range of 200 kilometres and can sustain roughly 90 minutes of flight time. The new drone factory will help Iran to improve relations with Tajikistan after a period of lingering diplomatic tension, and General Mohammad Bagheri described its inauguration as a turning point in bilateral military cooperation between the two countries. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

In late May 2022, Armenia and Azerbaijan established national commissions for border delimitation and demarcation. The two countries are close to signing a deal on the restoration of communications and will soon launch negotiations on elaborating a bilateral agreement. Currently, experts and societies wonder what these developments mean for the future of the self-proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic. Discussions are underway, and different ideas have been put forward. Some Azerbaijani experts started to circulate the possibility of autonomy for Nagorno Karabakh, hinting that Azerbaijan may change its post-2020 war rhetoric, denying the existence of Nagorno Karabakh and claiming that the issue of status was thrown into the dustbin of history. There is a lack of details on what this autonomy could be. READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

The unprovoked Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24th, 2022 has substantially changed the security situation around the Black Sea. The three NATO member states Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey have pursued a very different and distinct policy with regard to Russia. Bulgaria, as will be further presented, remains dependent on Russian gas and oil. Despite the recent Russian decision to halt gas exports to Bulgaria over the country’s refusal to pay for supplies in roubles, Bulgaria did not buckle under pressure. Romania maintains a watchful eye after the Russian military operations along the Black Sea coast, in general, and the city of Odessa, in particular. Turkey maintains balanced relations with Russia and Ukraine. READ MORE.

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

As Armenia and Azerbaijan come closer to launching bilateral negotiations over the normalisation of relations, many issues wait for a solution. Currently, the hottest debates are underway regarding the future status of Nagorno Karabakh and the legal modalities of the transit for Armenian and Azerbaijani goods passing each other territories. The war in Ukraine and the complete collapse of Russia – West relations added geopolitical components to the equilibrium. Do we have EU – Russia competition over the mediation process? Are there any disagreements between Brussels and Moscow on promoting lasting peace and stability in the South Caucasus? All these issues are worthy of being discussed and debated. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On May 12, the Foreign Ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia held another meeting in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, on the side-lines of the Russia-led Commonwealth of Independent States Ministerial summit, and with the participation of the Russian foreign minister. Although Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan characterized the meeting as another “productive interaction” between the warring parties, little progress has been made in the peace negotiations between Baku and Yerevan since the 6 April meeting of the leaders of the two countries in Brussels. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On May 22, 2022, Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Aliyev met in Brussels. The meeting was facilitated by the President of the European Council Charles Michel. For many observers, the May 22 trilateral meeting created a feeling of déjà vu. The same leaders were in Brussels less than two months ago. On April 6, 2022, Michel organized another meeting between Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders with the same sequence and results. Michel met separately with two leaders, then they held hours-long trilateral discussions, and late in the night, he published a statement summarizing the results. On April 6, participants discussed the same issues as on May 22 – the restoration of communications, the start of the border delimitation and demarcation process, and the launch of negotiations to sign a bilateral Armenia-Azerbaijan treaty. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The issue of the status of Nagorno Karabakh cannot be avoided in future discussions on an Armenia-Azerbaijan bilateral peace treaty. One solution is to agree to some transitional arrangement.
The April 6 Brussels meeting between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev gave the Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiations new momentum. The sides agreed to establish a border delimitation and demarcation commission and take steps to launch negotiations over the signature of a bilateral peace treaty. These issues were also agreed upon in principle back in November 2021, when two leaders had a meeting in Sochi facilitated by Russian President Vladimir Putin. READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

There is no doubt that the ongoing Russian military action against Ukraine profoundly affects the rest of the Black Sea littoral states: Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania and Turkey. The tense standoff of recent weeks placed each of them in a difficult position between apprehension and, particularly with Turkey, a kind of peacemaker or rather mediator, which Russia now ignores completely.
Romanian Defence Minister, Vasile Dincu, said in January 2022 that “Russia, at the moment, is not a direct threat to Romania, but it is [rather] a threat to security in the [Black Sea] area”. The author disagrees with the minister’s statement since the Russian military, which is stationed on the occupied Crimean peninsula - not much more than 100 km from the Danube Delta – is a direct threat to Romania, even though Russian officials will blame the other side for posing a threat to Russia. Furthermore, the region’s three NATO member countries, namely Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, have until today been unable to create and implement a comprehensive Black Sea security strategy together with NATO aspirants Georgia and Ukraine to counter the challenges posed by Russia. The latter, however, successfully implemented its divide and rule policy in the region. READ MORE.

Policy Recommendations from the 21st workshop of RSSC SG/PfP Consortium

The Regional Stability in the South Caucasus Study Group (RSSC SG) was proud to resume its activities in a face-to face format in Rome, 7-10 September 2021. On that occasion, the Study Group discussed and subsequently agreed on a number of policy recommendations. The second Karabakh war was the catalyst for massive changes in the South Caucasus. Certainly, the new territorial realities fit better the internationally recognized territories of both countries, but important challenges remain, making it important for the RSSC SG to meet to spur thinking on the way forward. The conflict was also an opportunity for other regional actors. Georgia deployed uncommon diplomacy and peace-making skills in the aftermath of the combat phase between Armenia and Azerbaijan. While Georgia demonstrated its ability at being an effective bridge between the two belligerents, Russia established itself as the essential arbiter and guarantor of a fragile ceasefire, and of purveyor of security for new lines of demarcation between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Turkey has not waited and sided with Azerbaijan in achieving and securing the new territorial realities. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On February 22, the President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev made an paid official trip visit to Moscow to discuss and sign a new declaration on allied cooperation with Russia. The visit came just a day after President Putin's infamous decision to recognize the independence of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk Peoples' Republic in Eastern Ukraine. President Vladimir Putin’s “unexpected” decision deteriorated relations with Ukraine, even more and was followed by the new round of economic sanctions imposed by the U.S and the EU.
President Aliyev's visit to Moscow triggered debates in Azerbaijan and Russia, respectively, on whether the main text of the declaration was pre-negotiated between the two leaders, or prepared amid the escalation around Ukraine. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

Since its emergence in the 1980s, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) has been a significant source of concern to the state of Turkey. With the escalation of conflict between the Turkish state and the ethnic Kurdish community in the 1990s, the level of violence explicitly increased, and the civilian death toll rose to its highest point. Though the PKK could not ensure absolute authority in large, predominantly Kurdish provinces in the southeast, it gradually shifted to a new strategy —urban violence— to undermine the Turkish state's authority in Kurdish regions.
According to theories of violent resistance, violence is the only practical and productive tool of mass mobilisation of ethnic insurgencies against political systems. In the case of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, many scholars argue that Turkey's policy of ethnic nationalism has had a decisive role in shaping Kurdish ethnic nationalism throughout these years. READ MORE

By Fuad Shahbazov, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

The current border tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia are not the first and likely not the last. Given this, a successful border demarcation/delimitation process could be a crucial point in paving the way for a final peace agreement between the two adversaries. Therefore, the resumption of direct peace talks is the only rational option. Last month, shortly after the first anniversary of the 44-day Karabakh war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, saw a new phase of violent hostilities, and the fighting was far from conventional. Deadly skirmishes occurred on the Azerbaijan–Armenia's international border, in a place named Giziltapa (Tsitserrnakar) near Syunik province. According to the Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan, the tensions flared up due to the Armenian Armed Forces' intensive artillery fires at the positions of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces. In response, the Armenian Ministry of Defence accused the Azerbaijani side of provocation, violating international borders, and spreading disinformation regarding the skirmishes. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

In the past few years, Turkey has been gradually increasing its influence in Ukraine through trade and military cooperation amid escalating tensions between Moscow and Kyiv, challenging Moscow’s standing in the Black Sea region. The strategic cooperation between Ankara and Kyiv is not limited to political statements, but rather encompasses other important fields, such as the economy, security and defence industries. Moreover, relations between the two countries gained further impetus with Russia’s unification of Crimea in 2014 and reached their peak during the administration of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who assumed office in 2019. READ MORE

By Fuad Shahbazov, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

In the period immediately after the 44-day Karabakh war, Baku-Tehran relations remained on the level of pragmatic co-operation, until the new conservative political establishment ascended to power in Iran. Since then, Tehran’s rhetoric against Azerbaijan has shifted from that of “partnership” to open threats that explicitly neglect the partnership atmosphere. Relations between Baku and Tehran have always been unstable, particularly at the beginning of the 2000s. However, they rekindled when both countries became engaged in regional infrastructure and transit projects. READ MORE

By Hayk KOTANJIAN, Lieutenant General (Ret.), D.Sc., Professor of Political Science of the RA, RF, USA (state studies-strategic security studies), Full Member of the Academy of Military Sciences of the RF

In the wake of the 44-day war in 2020, an unprecedented escalation of the process of delimitation and demarcation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani borders has been launched. This was done contrary to the principles and procedure for border delimitation and demarcation recommended by the OSCE Secretariat. The unparalleled pressure on the Armenian population from Karabakh was accompanied by subsequent attempts to undermine the settlement process under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmanship. Among the arguments substantiating claims to include Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, Baku authorities refer to the Azerbaijani-language toponymy, which allegedly has a long history. READ MORE

By Alan Whitehorn, Professor Emeritus in Political Science, The Royal Military College of Canada

Armenia is at yet another critical time. The war losses were substantial and impacted greatly. Violent Azerbaijani-Armenian border incidents continue, with property damage, military personnel injuries and deaths. The risks ahead are significant. Accordingly, it is crucial to assess the geopolitical situation that confronts Armenia, commencing first with key problems and challenges and then exploring some opportunities.
Amongst the pressing issues is the fact that demographically Armenia has far less manpower than Azerbaijan, even if women were conscripted too. Armenia’s population has been declining significantly due to outmigration and this pattern has been accelerating after the recent Karabakh war and various phases of the Covid pandemic. An army historically based on conscription needs to address its critical declining population base. READ MORE

By Eugene Kogan, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

Local domestic military aerospace expertise has been honed over a period of almost 60 years. Israel’s procurement of US-built fighter aircraft and Israeli technicians and aeronautical engineers developing subsystems and avionics for the jets has enhanced their skills and expertise.
Rafael Advanced Defence Systems’ cooperation with Raytheon has taken military aerospace expertise to the next level. The triple combination of buying from the United States, developing subsystems locally, and teaming up with the US has contributed to successful arms exports from Israel. The Ministry of Defence International Defence Cooperation Authority (known as SIBAT) realised in November 2019 that the international arms market was undergoing serious changes and certain adjustments would be needed in order to remain competitive and increase the market share of Israeli defence companies. READ MORE.