By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The defeat in the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war shocked Armenia and Armenians all around the world. It ruined many perceptions deeply entrenched in political elites, expert and academic communities, and broader society: including that the Armenian army was the strongest in the South Caucasus, that Russia would not allow Turkey's involvement in Azerbaijan's war against Armenia, and that the West would not allow authoritarian Azerbaijan and Turkey to attack democratic Armenia. All these assumptions were crushed within 44 days, leaving Armenia facing a much harsher geopolitical reality. Despite this terrible outcome, many in Armenia believed that the November 10, 2020, trilateral statement would foment a new status quo. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On October 6, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Prague on the sidelines of the European Political Community summit. This was the first meeting between Armenian and Turkish leaders since the failure of “football diplomacy” in 2008-2009. This meeting may play a positive role in fostering Armenia-Turkey normalization. Meanwhile, Armenia needs a better understanding of Turkey’s regional strategy in the South Caucasus and of the role that Turkey attaches to its relations with Armenia in that framework.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey’s strategic goal in the South Caucasus has been to dominate the region. Turkish regional dominance is only possible at the expense of Russia’s leading position, which puts Turkey and Russia at strategic loggerheads in the region. Neither the recent warming of relations between Ankara and Moscow, nor initiatives like the establishment of the Astana format for Syria or the 3+2 format for the South Caucasus, have changed the fundamental parameters of the Russia-Turkey rivalry in the South Caucasus. READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

Sweden and Finland have long followed a policy of military neutrality so as not to incur Russia’s wrath. However, the unprovoked Russian war against Ukraine has changed the attitude of these countries. Both Sweden and Finland announced their wish to join the North Atlantic Alliance in mid-May. Then, out of the blue, came obstruction from Turkey with the claim that both countries were financing terror and supporting Kurdish “terrorist” groups that Turkey has been trying to eliminate for the last 40 years or so. One of the major handicaps of the North Atlantic Treaty was and still is the omission of information about a NATO country blocking the participation of non-NATO states in NATO activities or the joining of new NATO members into the Alliance. Admission of new NATO members requires the unanimous consent of all members and the subsequent ratification of protocols by their respective parliaments. READ MORE.

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

During my academic visit to New Delhi in February 2020, I met with Indian politicians and scholars and discussed opportunities for upgrading Armenian-Indian relations. While back then the idea of arms trade was still immature, I raised the issue of defence cooperation between the two countries. Through honest discussions about the Armenian cause, I came to a conclusion, which I summarized in a November 2020 article for the Armenian Weekly. Despite today’s tumultuous climate in Armenia, it’s reassuring to learn that this 2020 recommendation has materialized, and bilateral ties are taking military and strategic dimensions. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

With the unprovoked military intervention in Ukraine, Russia has been isolated economically and politically due to the Western-imposed sanctions. But while the sanctions banned Russia from trading with the Western states, particularly in the energy field, some nations still prefer to maintain trade relations with Moscow. Countries like Iran, China and India are seeking to strengthen trade turnover by pushing the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) project for a better connection via a multimodal transport network that spans rail, road, and sea. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The visit of Nancy Pelosi to Armenia created quite a lot of hype, since some saw in it the prospects for national salvation. But the visit's "democracy vs authoritarianism agenda" is risky for Armenia. Armenia should send clear signals to Russia and Iran that it has no intention to join the “democracy vs. authoritarianism fight” and will never allow anyone to use its territory for anti-Iranian or anti-Russian activities.

On September 17, 2022, Nancy Pelosi, the US House of Representatives speaker, arrived in Armenia for a three–day visit. She was the highest-ranking US official to visit Armenia since the country got its independence in 1991. The visit was agreed upon weeks, if not months in advance, but it took place only a few days after Azerbaijan had launched a new aggression against Armenia on September 13, 2022. The ceasefire was reached in late September 14 through the active mediation efforts of Russia, the US, and other external players. However, these hostilities overshadowed the visit. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

On August 5, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin had a four-hour meeting in Russia to discuss bilateral ties and regional issues. The Sochi summit comes after Ankara scored a diplomatic victory by helping broker a grain deal between Turkey, Ukraine and Russia that has eased global food crisis fears and growing concerns of possible Turkish military escalation against the Kurds in Northern Syria. What implication will the summit have on the region? READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Since February 24, 2022, the international community's focus was concentrated entirely on the war in Ukraine and the growing Russia – West confrontation. It seemed that nothing could change the situation until the end of hostilities in Ukraine. However, on August 2 and 3, almost everyone’s attention shifted from Ukraine to Taiwan. As the Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, stated her intention to visit Taiwan, up to half a million people were watching the trajectory of her plane on air flight tracking sites. The negative reaction of China, including the warning of President Xi during his conversation with President Biden that those who played with fire would be perished by it, created hype around this visit. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

In the last 10 days, the most discussed issue amongst Armenian media, experts and political circles was the statement of Iran’s Supreme Leader during his meetings with the Russian and Turkish presidents held in Tehran. The presidents of Russia, Iran and Turkey gathered together to discuss the future of Syria in the Astana format amidst the ongoing war in Ukraine and complete rupture of Russia-West relations. Few could imagine that the Supreme Leader would mention Armenia and, in particular, the Armenia-Iran border during the summit. However, the Iranian message was clear: Iran will not tolerate the closure of the Armenia-Iran border. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Despite Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s adherence to the ideology of pan-Turkism, the former-Soviet republic has long managed to successfully balance its relations between Russia, Turkey, and the west. However, the ‘frozen conflict’ with Armenia over disputed Nagorno-Karabakh territory, and the on-going conflict in Ukraine, have recently tested the limits of this balancing act. In January 2022, as Russia’s military build-up on Ukraine’s border was in full swing, Aliyev visited his counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv and reaffirmed Baku’s support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Then, the following month – just two days before Russia announced its ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine – Aliyev was in Moscow signing a treaty of alliance with Russian President Vladimir Putin. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The election of Joe Biden as president in November 2020 raised hopes among the international community that the United States will restore the nuclear deal signed in 2015. Many architects of the deal returned to positions in the White House and State Department. The other signatories of the deal, including the three EU states, China and Russia, were ready to contribute to the restoration of the deal. Conventional wisdom said that Iran should be interested in restoring the deal, too. The economic downturn triggered by the re-imposition of the US sanctions created significant challenges for the Iranian government. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Armenia–Turkey normalization process was officially launched on January 14, 2022 when special representatives – the Deputy Speaker of the Armenian Parliament Ruben Rubinyan and Ambassador Serdar Kılıç – met in Moscow. The groundwork for this meeting began in mid-2021, when the Armenian government proposed the idea of peace in the South Caucasus and normalizing relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Armenia’s catastrophic defeat in the 2020 Karabakh war seemed to put aside one of the main obstacles to launching the Armenia–Turkey normalization process. The 2008-2009 “football diplomacy” failed mainly due to Turkey’s precondition to Armenia to return “occupied lands” to Azerbaijan. By signing the November 10, 2020 statement, the Armenian government accepted the loss of seven regions outside the former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAR), as well as 30-percent of territories of NKAR itself. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

A remarkable event occurred on March 11 in Baku when Azerbaijan and Iran, after a period of turbulence in their bilateral relations, signed a new document establishing new transport and electricity supply links connecting mainland Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhichevan via Iranian territory. The Minister of Urban Development of Iran, Rustam Ghasemi, signed the document from the Iranian side. The fact that Rustem Ghasemi had previously paid frequent visits to Azerbaijan to discuss potential economic cooperation with Azerbaijan indicate persistent Iranian attempts to gain at least a minimal political foothold. The signing of a major cooperation document between Baku and Tehran so soon following the heated border tensions in October 2021, surprised some observers. READ MORE

By Alan WHITEHORN, Professor Emeritus in Political Science, The Royal Military College of Canada

Coming to power after the break-up of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, Lukashenko had ruled Belarus in a highly autocratic fashion for almost three decades, while seeking to navigate his country within Moscow’s sphere of influence. However, the aging leader’s arbitrary rule began to teeter and he faced a major challenge in the election of 2020. When skewed and rigged election results were announced, hundreds of thousands of voters of Belarus peacefully protested their strong objections.
The West echoed moral support to the mass of citizens voicing democratic demands on the streets, but provided little material assistance. Somewhat optimistically and naively, the West trusted that the unarmed people would peacefully prevail over the coercive might of the internal and external dictators in Minsk and Moscow. Putin, by contrast, sensing a vulnerable and weakened regime, provided his fellow authoritarian colleague with external assistance to forcefully crush the peaceful demonstrators. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

If Russia successfully resists the unprecedented pressure from the West and remains one of the main poles in the emerging multipolar world, its interests lie in balancing Turkish influence in its neighborhood, including the South Caucasus. It does not imply that Russia and Turkey will stop their economic cooperation. It simply means that Russia will seek to prevent Turkish dominance over the South Caucasus.
The Russian “special military operation” in Ukraine launched on February 24, 2022, has shaken global geopolitics and geoeconomics. It completely ruined Russia – West relations and resulted in unprecedented sanctions on Russia, including cutting several Russian banks from the SWIFT financial messaging system, dubbed by economists as a "financial nuclear option". NATO member countries, including the US, UK, Germany, and several east European states, supply Ukraine with various lethal weapons while rejecting Ukraine's plea for imposing a no-fly zone, as the Russian President indicated that the Kremlin would perceive that move as a declaration of war. READ MORE

By Alan WHITEHORN, Professor Emeritus in Political Science, The Royal Military College of Canada

Divide and conquer is a well-known historic aphorism for ambitious imperial states. Divide and control is a corollary. Since the break-up of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, Moscow’s geo-political and foreign policy has opted on a number of occasions to initiate or accentuate the splitting away of small fragments from somewhat weak newly independent states. In so doing, Moscow could more effectively re-assert some control over its historic ‘near abroad’ and re-extend its sphere of influence over parts of the former Soviet Union. Amongst the examples are: Transnistria splintering from Moldova in 1991, South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia in the early 1990s, and Donetsk and Luhansk from Ukraine in 2014. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On February 21, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed decrees recognizing the independence of Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics and agreements with these two entities on friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance. On February 22, President Putin stated that Russia recognized these states within territories envisaged by their constitutions, which cover entire territories of former Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts of Ukraine, while the de facto Republics control only 30 percent of the oblasts' territories. On early morning February 24, President Putin declared the launch of special military operation in Ukraine. He stated that Russian goal is the demilitarization of Ukraine and added that Russia has no intention to occupy Ukrainian territories. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Economic cooperation in the South Caucasus may bring lasting stability if vital interests are taken into account.
Regional economic cooperation in the South Caucasus has always been the focus of international organizations and external powers as a tangible way to stabilize the region and pave the way for conflict settlement. After the end of the first Karabakh war in 1994, in close cooperation with Turkey and under strong US support, Azerbaijan launched several regional infrastructure projects—oil and gas pipelines and railways connecting Azerbaijan with Turkey via Georgia. Azerbaijan and Turkey excluded Armenia from these projects and imposed an economic blockade, viewing this exclusion as a tool to force Armenia to give up Nagorno Karabakh. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

At the recent face-to-face meetings of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in Sochi and Brussels at the end of 2021, the two leaders agreed to restore the Soviet-era Yeraskh- Julfa- Meghri- Horadiz railway connection between the two countries, which has not been in operation for three decades. However, the major expectations regarding the border delimitation/demarcation process and opening of Nakhchivan corridor remained unresolved. The last round of negotiations in Sochi was arranged in the light of deadly border skirmishes which left 13 soldiers killed on each side. While both leaders "agreed to take tangible steps for further de-escalation in the border area" the agreement on the railway connection between Baku and Yerevan was again reaffirmed during the Brussels meeting hosted by European Council President Charles Michel on December 14. READ MORE

By Fuad Shahbazov, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On October 6, 2021, Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov met his Iranian counterpart Hossein Amir Abdollahian in Moscow to discuss regional security and economic cooperation, and to address important concerns regarding the crisis in the South Caucasus. During the joint press conference, Lavrov repeatedly highlighted the idea of a “3+3 cooperation format” including the three South Caucasus states – Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia – plus their three large neighbours, Russia, Turkey, and Iran, to focus on unlocking economic and transport communications in the region. The first meeting within the format took place in Moscow on December 2021; however, Georgia refused to take part. Moreover, recent tensions in the region between Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as Azerbaijan and Iran suggest that the proposed format will not generate visible positive outcomes. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

In February 2021, I wrote an article “Turkey’s Pivot in Central Asia: A Calculated Risk?” and asked to what extent can Turkey push its pan-Turkic aspirations in Central Asia? If Turkey’s economic and energy relations in Central Asia continue to deepen, will it inevitably increase engagement on security issues as a means to protect them? Will Russia and China tolerate a NATO member exerting its influence near their traditional zones of influence? The developments in Kazakhstan clearly provided answers to these questions.
Long seen as the pole of stability in Central Asia, Kazakhstan has faced its most serious political crisis to date. What began as a reaction to a spike in fuel prices in the western oil-producing regions spread across the country with unprecedented calls for reform, before escalating into violence in the country’s biggest city, Almaty. The protest movement in Kazakhstan quickly escalated and turned violent as protesters seized and set alight government buildings. After failing to quell the unrest, President Kassym- Jomart Tokayev launched a “counter-terror” operation to regain control of the situation and appealed to the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) for military assistance. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

2023 will be a crucial elections year in Turkey, and there is no certainty that president Erdogan and his AK Party can maintain their hold on power. The stakes are high and political turmoil will have implications way beyond Turkey itself.

The latest Russia-US and Russia-NATO tensions have entirely shifted the attention of the media and the expert community to Ukraine. Tens, if not hundreds, of papers and policy briefs are published daily, seeking to understand what Russia wants in Ukraine and whether Russia and the West will come to a diplomatic solution and avoid war. As a NATO member and Black Sea littoral state Turkey has a significant role in these calculations. What will be Turkey's reaction if war breaks out in or around Ukraine, and how will the war impact Russia - Turkey relations in other regions – the Middle East, South Caucasus, Balkans, and North Africa? READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

We need time to understand better what happened in Kazakhstan, and why". Whilst sending CSTO troops to Kazakhstan was clearly President Putin's decision to support President Tokayev in the internal fight between Kazakh local elites, the deployment has implications also for other countries participating in the mission, including Armenia.

The beginning of 2022 surprised many. While experts and pundits were busy discussing the possible outcome of the Russia – US and Russia - NATO negotiations, scheduled for early January, and seeking to predict if large-scale hostilities would break out in Ukraine, Kazakhstan imploded. This vast country with less than 20 million population, with huge reserves of oil, uranium, and other minerals and a significant geographical location connecting China with Russia and Europe, seemed to be an island of stability in the vast landmass of Eurasia. President Nursultan Nazarbayev had ruled the country since its independence, and while he stepped down in 2019, he maintained his influence and control from the position of Chairman of the Security Council. The second President of Kazakhstan, Kassym - Jomart Tokayev, a professional diplomat who started his career in the Soviet Union, seemed to be an excellent choice for Nazarbayev, enabling him to organize a smooth power transition, keep the stability of the country, and his primordial leading position. READ MORE

By Eldor Aripov, Director of the Institute for Strategic and Interregional Studies under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan is on the eve of an important political event - the presidential elections in the country. This major political event was launched at the meeting of the Central Election Commission of the Republic of Uzbekistan, which took place on July 23, 2021. Today, the election campaign is in full swing, and it is taking place in a new political atmosphere. All processes are conducted openly, transparently and in accordance with the national electoral legislation and the time frames specified therein. All five parties that have nominated their candidates are actively promoting their program ideas and platforms. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The Russian resort town of Sochi was turned into the spotlight of South Caucasus geopolitics on November 26 as Russian President Vladimir Putin hosted Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev for the much-anticipated trilateral meeting. The gathering was first announced by the Russian President’s Press-Secretary Dmitri Peskov to be held on November 8–12 to mark the first anniversary of the November 10, 2020, trilateral statement, which fixed the devastating defeat of Armenia in the 2020 Karabakh war. Some Armenian media leaked news about the upcoming meeting even earlier, arguing that another document violating Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh’s vital national interests was in the works. READ MORE