By Fuad Shahbazov, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

Kazakhstan has recently been making steps to improve its defence capabilities. In April 2025, the Kazakh Ministry of Defence confirmed that a legislative framework was established to regulate the Defence Industry Development Fund, which was created in December 2023. The new defence fund aims to acquire and manufacture domestically crucial military hardware, such as artillery ammunition, weapons systems, and combat modules. For this purpose, the Kazakh government plans to allocate approximately $265 million from the state budget. Earlier, on March 3, Kazakh Defence Minister Ruslan Zhaksylykov announced the establishment of a new defence industry centre at the only tank repair plant in Central Asia in the Eastern city of Semey. Zhaksylykov proclaimed that the new hub aims to strengthen “Kazakhstan’s self-sufficiency in defence production” through “expanding the ability to both maintain and manufacture crucial military technologies locally”. As the regional order in Eurasia shifts amid Russia’s war against Ukraine, Kazakhstan is opting to rely on its armed forces, domestic military resources, and international security partnership formats to counter any potential threat. READ MORE

By Elkhan NURIYEV, PhD, Senior Fellow at the Mathias Corvinus Collegium Foundation in Budapest and Senior Fellow at the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation in Berlin

Just over two months into U.S. President Donald Trump’s second term, new uncertainties have begun to reshape the West’s approach toward the war in Ukraine. As the conflict grinds through its third year, signs of strategic drift have emerged across Western capitals. With battlefield momentum stalled, political divisions deepening, and public fatigue rising, the West now faces a narrowing window to reassess its goals—or risk drifting toward a scenario of prolonged stalemate and fractured unity. While former president Joe Biden framed the war as a broader fight for democracy and pledged open–ended support to Kyiv, Trump’s foreign policy instincts emphasize burden sharing, cost efficiency, and transactional diplomacy. These principles are already shaping Washington’s posture. Military aid packages have slowed, public rhetoric has shifted toward ending the war “quickly,” and U.S. diplomatic overtures increasingly hint at conditional support rather than blank checks. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Over the past few weeks, security events have dramatically accelerated Israel’s aggression on Lebanon. On October 8, 2023, Hezbollah, a paramilitary political party in Lebanon (also known as the Islamic Resistance) backed by Iran, opened a front against Israel to assist Hamas in its conflict with Israel following its “al-Aqsa Storm” operation. The Lebanese front remained “managed” as Israel and Hezbollah engaged in limited clashes. This equation changed starting on September 17, 2024. Along with its fight against Hamas and the destruction of Gaza, Israel shifted its focus to Hezbollah and started bombing Lebanon, destroying the party’s infrastructure in southern Beirut, South Lebanon and Beqaa near the border with Syria. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On July 31, US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs James O’Brien reaffirmed Washington’s plans to establish a land trade route through Azerbaijan and Armenia. He stated that this route aims to offer Central Asian countries an alternative and reduce their reliance on Russia and China for access to global markets. In addition to his earlier remarks, O’Brien pointed out that part of this strategy is aimed to “create conditions” for Armenia to “distance itself from Russia”. According to him, Armenia is “almost completely dependent” on Russia for its economy and energy. Therefore, the United States supports Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s bold steps in his diversification efforts. Armenia’s re-posturing is representative of a geopolitical shift occurring throughout the wider region as the three states of the South Caucasus move further away from Russian influence. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

After the end of the Cold War, Turkish decision-makers adopted a “top-down” strategy that capitalized on the dramatic shift in international arms production. Turkey aimed to look eastward to cooperate with China and Russia as its threat perception changed. In the second half of the 1990s, Turkey became a prominent Israeli arms purchaser. There were numerous factors behind this. First, Israeli weapons were a high-tech and credible alternative to NATO weapons. Second, unlike Europe and the U.S., Israeli arms purchases were not conditioned to Turkey’s domestic developments (democratization, human rights, minority rights…). Third, Israel and Turkey’s foreign policies overlapped in critical areas in the Middle East, aiming to contain Syrian and Iranian interests. Finally, deep relations with Israel were expected to be rewarded by pro-Israeli lobbying groups in the U.S. to counter the Armenian and Greek lobbies. READ MORE

By Fuad Shahbazov, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On January 28, 2024, masked assailants attacked a Roman Catholic church in Istanbul, killing one person. Shortly afterward, the Islamic State, through its official Amaq News Agency, claimed responsibility. Turkish police detained 47 people, most Central Asian nationals. The incident shed light on the growing presence in Turkey of a Central Asian offshoot of the Islamic State group known as ISIS-K for Khorasan, once a large portion of the Persian Empire now divided among Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asian states. The January 28 assault was the group’s first successful attack in Turkey since January 1, 2017, when jihadists invaded an Istanbul nightclub, killing 39 people and wounding nearly 80.
Since then, Turkish security forces have launched mass counter-operations against ISIS suspects in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. The operations appear to have deterred deadly terrorist attacks in large urban and border areas and to have depleted the militants’ financial resources. With the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, ISIS-K suspended overseas activities to focus more on Afghanistan and try to undermine the Taliban, which resumed control over the country after the Americans left. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

The geopolitics of the South Caucasus is as unpredictable as ever. Even as recently as the beginning of April, few, if any, would have imagined that Russia may withdraw its peacekeeping contingent from the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan anytime soon. Many observers were even sceptical about the possibility of their withdrawal in November 2025 – the date which was stipulated in the November 2020 trilateral statement as the potential but not fixed date for the ending of the peacekeeping mission of Russia. This skepticism was grounded in the understanding that for Russia, Karabakh holds paramount importance in the broader context of the South Caucasus. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Since Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s March 18 visit to Voskepar and Kiranc villages in the Tavush region, discussions and debates have been underway in Armenia on the situation along the Armenia – Azerbaijan border in that region. The visit took place after the statement of the office of Azerbaijan’s Deputy Prime Minister Shahin Mustafayev, demanding the immediate return of “four non-enclave Azerbaijani villages’” located in Tavush along the Armenia – Azerbaijan border to Azerbaijan which were in principle covered in the demarcation and delimitation negotiations. During his meetings with villagers, the Armenian prime minister stated that “the process of delimitation and demarcation between Armenia and Azerbaijan was entering the practical stage.” Despite acknowledging that there were no agreements on maps and principles of the process and that Azerbaijan would not leave the Armenian territories currently under its control, the prime minister argued for withdrawing from those villages to avoid a new war. After these meetings, some representatives of the Armenian leadership, including the speaker of the National Assembly, started to state that those territories were not part of Armenia and should be returned to Azerbaijan. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

After the military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan in September 2023 and the forced displacement of the Armenians who lived there, there were hopes in Armenia and abroad that an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement was within reach. These hopes were based on the assumption that Azerbaijan had achieved its primary objective for the past 30 years: the full absorption of Nagorno-Karabakh into Azerbaijan without any Armenian claims over the region.
Since September 2023, Azerbaijan has controlled all of Nagorno-Karabakh, with only a handful of Armenians remaining there. The Armenian government has accepted this reality and has no intention of challenging it. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan has faced no repercussions from the US, the EU, or Russia for imposing a blockade on Nagorno-Karabakh in December 2022, ignoring the orders of the International Court of Justice, launching a military attack in September 2023, or forcing all Armenians to leave the region. It seemed that the time for peace had thus arrived – a peace that would formalize Azerbaijani control over Nagorno-Karabakh, settle relations with Armenia, and open the way for the normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey. READ MORE

Mahinora Mirkhamidova, associate professor of the department International law and Public law disciplines of the University of World Economy and Diplomacy

Today over two-thirds of the world's countries are participants in the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted in 1979. Ensuring women's rights is one of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals, goal 5 specifically aims at “Achieving gender equality and empowering all women and girls.” The issues of ensuring women's rights are reflected in the constitutions of almost all countries, entrenched in their legislation, and hold a significant place in national development plans and strategies. READ MORE

Avazbek Kholbekov, expert of the Development Strategy Center

Over the past five years in Uzbekistan, a number of laws have been adopted in our country to ensure the priority of private property and strengthen its legal protection.
Most importantly, based on the principle of "From Action Strategy to Development Strategy" there was adopted the "Development Strategy of New Uzbekistan for 2022-2026", as a logical continuation of Action Strategy. In the document, turning the principles of justice and the rule of law into the most basic and necessary condition for development in the country was defined as one of the most important directions. Several necessary objectives were envisaged for this. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

The war between Hamas and Israel war has triggered strong anti-Israel sentiments in the region and heightened fears of a broader conflict engulfing actors such as Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. Worried that the conflict in Gaza could escalate into a regional confrontation, the US has dispatched two aircraft carrier strike groups within range, including additional troops and military advisors.
But alongside tough rhetoric, the violence in Gaza has renewed apparent pragmatism by important regional states such as Iran and Turkey. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has openly slammed Israel's bombings of the Palestinian coastal enclave. On the other hand, Ankara has avoided issuing direct threats against Tel Aviv and, in an apparent unusual move, allegedly distanced itself from Hamas in the aftermath of the Palestinian movement’s surprise attack on Israel last month. READ MORE

Taking into account the latest media reports on the new outbreak of hostilities on the Line of Contact in Karabakh (called Artsakh in Armenian) between local Armenian forces and the Azerbaijani military, I am gravely concerned about the loss of life and the indiscriminate destruction of civilian assets. As the Founder of the European Geopolitical Forum, an organisation which embraces peaceful means of conflict resolution, and which has been actively involved in finding a reasonable, sound and long-term solution to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh for some ten years, I call for an immediate end to all hostilities and a swift return of the parties to the negotiation table. I am encouraged by the breaking news of a Russian-mediated ceasefire. I call for the immediate, non-conditional resumption of the internationally mediated dialogue between Baku and representatives of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh. I also call on the Russian Federation, the United States and the European Union to actively demand peaceful settlement of the Karabakh conflict and to ensure that the ceasefire is respected without any form of deviation.

Dr Marat Terterov,
Founder, European Geopolitical Forum

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Since the launch of the first Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) war in the 1990s, the region’s status has been at the core of the conflict. This issue was the primary focus of negotiations and different settlement options put forward by the OSCE Minsk Group—package solution, phased approach, Common State, Key West, Kazan document, Lavrov plan—which all tried to find a mutually acceptable solution for the status of Artsakh. At the end of the day, Azerbaijan decided to solve this issue by military force. Azerbaijan probably came to this decision in the early 2000s, hoping it could get more by deploying military force than by any negotiated solutions. Azerbaijan was cautiously waiting for the geopolitical window of opportunity, which appeared in 2020 as a combination of the COVID-19 pandemic, elections in the U.S. and growing misperceptions of Armenia-Russia relations after the 2018 Velvet Revolution. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On September 19, Azerbaijan launched a large-scale offensive against the self-declared Nagorno Karabakh Republic with only one goal: to finish with that republic. The Azerbaijani attack was not a surprise to anyone. At least since the beginning of 2023, Azerbaijan has stated clearly and loudly that Baku will not tolerate the status quo that emerged after the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war and will do everything possible to destroy the Nagorno Karabakh Republic. Azerbaijan was also clear that it would reach its goal quickly. Since the beginning of September 2023, as Azerbaijan started to concentrate troops along the line of contact, it was clear the military offensive would take place very soon. Armenia knew that Russia knew that, the EU and the US knew that, and Nagorno Karabakh authorities knew that. What were the positions of the sides regarding the upcoming offensive of Azerbaijan? READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On September 9, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan spoke on the phone with the leaders of France, Iran, Georgia and Germany, as well as US Secretary of State Antony Blinken. In a manner that resembled his outreach to various world leaders at the beginning of the Second Karabakh War (September 7–November 10, 2020), the Armenian premier warned against intensifying tensions in the region and stated his readiness for immediate talks with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev without preconditions. Pashinyan’s words came on the heels of several setbacks that threaten to derail Armenian-Azerbaijani peace negotiations and may lead to another military conflict.
Both sides accuse each other of a military build-up along their shared border in preparation for an offensive. According to the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry, a military threat also emanates from the continued presence of Armenian troops in Karabakh, despite Yerevan’s earlier pledge to withdraw them by September 2022. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

As the humanitarian crisis deepens in the self-proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic and tens of thousands of people have found themselves in a daily struggle to get basic food, hygiene products, and other goods, discussions are underway in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and within the international community about ways out. Azerbaijan has its vision of the situation. According to Baku, if the international community, including Armenia, recognizes Nagorno Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan, then no one should reject supplying goods to Nagorno Karabakh from Azerbaijan. Many in Baku view this option as the first step towards the gradual reintegration of Nagorno Karabakh into Azerbaijan's economic and later political sphere. READ MORE

By Nika CHITADZE, PhD, Director of the Center for International Studies, Tbilisi

As it is known, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Moscow and Minsk agreed to deploy tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus. The construction of a special warehouse is already underway and will be completed by July 1 of this year. Therefore, it can be said that Putin's blackmailing strategy has entered the next acute phase, and it is theoretically possible that such steps will sooner or later push the world toward a nuclear confrontation. It should be noted that after the dissemination of information about the placement of nuclear weapons in Belarus, the US Department of Defence issued an emergency statement. It says that "the Pentagon sees no indication that Russia is preparing to use nuclear weapons." On the other hand, as Vladimir Putin told the Russian government media, ten Su-25 aircraft capable of carrying tactical nuclear weapons are already stationed on the territory of Belarus. In addition, according to him, Russia has given Belarus the "Iskander" missile system, which can also launch missiles equipped with a nuclear warhead. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

May 2023 will be remembered as the month of intensive negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It started from the four-day summit in Washington, where the two ministers of foreign affairs with their teams were engaged in face-to-face interactions to discuss the text of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement. Ten days later, Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders met in Brussels, revitalizing the Brussels format, which had been stalled in September 2022. As a result of the Brussels summit, the sides reiterated the mutual recognition of territorial integrity based on the Alma-Ata declaration. For the first time, they agreed to use exact numbers when describing each other’s territories. This step dispersed fears in Azerbaijan that despite signing the Prague statement in October 2022 and recognizing Azerbaijani territorial integrity based on the Alma-Ata declaration, Armenia may still avoid recognizing Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh) as part of Azerbaijan, arguing that Artsakh was not part of Azerbaijan on December 21, 1991, when the Alma-Ata declaration was signed. A few days later, the Armenian Prime Minister confirmed that Armenia recognizes Artsakh as part of Azerbaijan during his speech at the summit of the Council of Europe. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

After a break of several months Armenia and Azerbaijan have now resumed their engagement in peace negotiations in earnest. After a face-to-face meeting between leaders in Munich in February, the Armenian and Azerbaijani ministers of foreign affairs went to Washington in early May 2023 to take part in the most intensive round of negotiations ever held since the Spring 2001 Key West summit between Presidents Heydar Aliyev and Robert Kocharyan. The ministers achieved progress, opening the path for the 14 May Brussels summit involving Prime Minister Pashinyan, President Aliyev, and President of the European Union Council Charles Michel. On 19 May, the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers met in Moscow, and a trilateral Aliyev - Pashinyan - Putin summit was scheduled for 25 May. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On March 30, Azerbaijan officially inaugurated its first embassy in Tel Aviv, Israel, after avoiding the move for three decades. Although the decision highlighted the importance of Azerbaijani-Israeli relations, it quickly became a catalyst behind the renewed war of words between Iran and Azerbaijan. Since 2021, diplomatic relations between Tehran and Baku have steadily become embittered. Iran is primarily concerned with the decline of its influence in the South Caucasus, which has suffered since the end of the Second Karabakh War in 2020. As such, in an attempt by Tehran to flex its muscles and intimidate Azerbaijan, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps conducted large-scale military drills on the border with Azerbaijan in October 2022. Unlike previous years, the exercises provoked an uneasy reaction within Azerbaijan and triggered anti-Iranian sentiments throughout the country. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Efficient strategic communication has become necessary in the South Caucasus as the governments of the region and outside regional and global powers vie for influence in the current highly complex geopolitical realities. One of the priorities for the Armenian government is to explain clearly to public opinion what the recently deployed EU Monitoring Mission is and is not about. Otherwise, the same disappointment that emerged towards Russia earlier will surely appear as regards the European Union also.
The ups and downs in the Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiations process after the end of the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war, the launch of the Russia – Ukraine war, and the complete rupture of Russia – West relations added complexity to the geopolitical realities of the South Caucasus. Too many actors have contradicting interests in region – Russia, the US, the EU, Iran, Turkey, and Israel. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine launched in early 2022 has fundamentally changed the international security architecture that had existed for many years, but it has also caused global political and economic cataclysms. Although Russian forces made significant gains thanks to heavy artillery fire, including missile strikes on cities all over Ukraine in the first weeks of combat, Ukrainian defenders quickly rebuffed attempts by consolidating its military power, exercising diplomatic connections, and launching counterattacks at Russian positions. The failures of continuous artillery and missile strikes in the following months prompted Russia to make some changes in its military tactics. As a result, Russia was forced to seek help from its traditional allies China and Iran through unofficial channels. Although China has refrained from overtly providing military support to Russia in order not to further complicate relations with Western countries, particularly with the United States, Iran began supplying locally produced long-range attack (suicide) drones to Russia. READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

It is a paradox that two democratic Nordic countries that are willing to join NATO and become interoperable with it are kept at bay by pseudo-democratic NATO member Turkey. As long as this situation persists, Russia strategically has the last laugh. This could have been avoided if the proposed policy recommendations had been implemented by NATO some time ago.
To begin with, it is crucial to recall a preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty (Washington Treaty 1949), namely: ‘The Parties to this Treaty are determined to safeguard the freedom – founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law’. Obviously, these principles have been repeatedly trampled upon by Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan over the last decade. And now, two democratic candidates for NATO membership, Finland and Sweden, have to fulfil conditions virtually imposed by the pseudo-democratic government of Turkey. This is a worrying paradox. READ MORE

By Nika CHITADZE, PhD, Director of the Center for International Studies, Tbilisi

As it is known, the liberation of Kherson has already been assessed as a great military and an important political and psychological victory for Ukraine. Now it is possible to analyze what new opportunities this gives to the Ukrainian army and how things will develop. At the same time, the Russian forces launched a massive offensive in the Donetsk region, and are carrying out more intensive missile attacks against the critical infrastructure of Ukraine, as a result of which, first of all, the civilian population of the country is harmed and the victims are increasing more and more. With all of the above, the Russians want to somehow cover up the Kherson disaster. At the same time, it is worth noting the fact that the Russian army is insufficiently equipped and not ready for the winter war. This is the main reason why the Russians are asking for negotiations. According to them, depending on the situation on the front, the events may develop in two scenarios - the parties take the so-called winter break, or the armed forces of Ukraine develop an offensive to the south - first in the direction of Melitopol and Mariupol, and then in the direction of Crimea. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On December 12, 2022, Azerbaijan blocked the Lachin corridor, the only route connecting the self-proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic with the outside world. The corridor is blocked by "eco–activists," who initially demanded access for the relevant Azerbaijani state institutions to monitor the copper-molybdenum mine in Nagorno Karabakh. They argued that Nagorno Karabakh authorities did not meet international standards. However, very soon, the list of demands started to increase – the resignation of the newly appointed state minister of the self-proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic, Ruben Vardanyan, and the establishment of an Azerbaijani checkpoint in the Lachin corridor were among the new demands added. Anyone, who has at least a basic understanding of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and has followed the developments there since the end of the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war, has no doubts that what has been going on in the Lachin corridor for almost a month is connected with geopolitics, rather than benign environmental concerns. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Over the past few weeks, I participated in multiple international and regional workshops and conferences in Europe and Russia and met with many European, Azerbaijani, Turkish, Iranian and Russian experts and politicians. These opportunities and encounters made me realize that we as Armenians must adapt to a new reality, revise our strategy (if we have one) and try to confront the dangers with the resources that we have. The possibility of a new war with Azerbaijan is very high, but proactive diplomacy and deterrence can postpone a major military clash.
I also realized a change in attitude in many Azerbaijani experts. Of course, we cannot generalize, but from their perspective, Azerbaijanis still firmly believe that the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis has been resolved, which the West and Russia do not agree on. They do not have enough leverage to force their will on Baku, as Azerbaijan is playing its energy card very well for now. Azerbaijanis have come to realize that if they enforce their will over Nagorno-Karabakh and engage in ethnic cleansing, there will be international backlash. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The developments of the last three weeks have proved that Armenia and Azerbaijan are far from signing a peace agreement, at least by the end of 2022. There is a danger that Azerbaijan may interpret this as a failure of the peace process and use this as a "moral justification" to launch a new large-scale aggression. If this happens, it will push Armenia and Azerbaijan further back from any chance to reach an agreement and deepen the mutual mistrust.
In recent months Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiation process passed through several ups and downs. The September 13-14, 2022, Azerbaijani aggression seemed to jeopardize the fragile achievements reached during the three Brussel summits held in April, May, and August 2022. However, immediately after the ceasefire reached on September 14, there was a new push toward reaching a peace agreement. Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers met in New York in late September and Geneva on October 2; Secretary of the Armenian Security Council Armen Grigoryan had a meeting with President Aliyev’s top foreign policy aide Hikmet Hajiyev in Washington on September 27, 2022. READ MORE