By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

On Jan. 13, 2026, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio met in Washington, D.C., to announce the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) Implementation Framework. The six-page document is the latest step toward implementing the commitments made at the White House on Aug. 8, 2025, aimed at establishing peace in the South Caucasus. According to the announcement, the “ultimate objective of TRIPP is to strengthen the prosperity and security of Armenia and Azerbaijan and further American commerce by expanding regional trade and connectivity, as well as creating new transit opportunities linking Central Asia and the Caspian to Europe. READ MORE

By Tabib HUSEYNOV, independent policy analyst and researcher

Diplomatic initiatives to end the war in Ukraine are fundamentally misguided, because they seek a political solution that remains unattainable under current circumstances. International efforts should instead focus on securing a stable ceasefire that locks in the existing contact line without conditioning its achievement on impractical and damaging political concessions on Ukraine’s sovereignty or the fate of its occupied territories. The durability of such a ceasefire should rest primarily on Ukraine’s own strength, not on international peacekeepers or Russia’s goodwill.
Ukraine and Russia are locked in a grinding stalemate. Neither can achieve a decisive military victory any time soon, and neither can accept the political terms the other demands. Russian forces make incremental advances, but at the expense of staggering losses. Latest data on Russian casualties from the Ukrainian General Staff and the Ukrainian open-source mapping project Deep State suggest that between January and December 2025, Russia lost roughly 96 troops per square kilometre taken. With roughly 5,000 square km of Donetsk Oblast still under Ukrainian control, Russia would need to sacrifice close to half a million servicemen to occupy the remainder. READ MORE

By Tabib HUSEYNOV, independent policy analyst and researcher

Azerbaijan-Russia relations have experienced a series of compounding crises since early 2025, raising questions about the future of Russian influence in the South Caucasus. This paper examines the underlying causes and strategic consequences of this shift in bilateral relationship, highlighting the decline of Russia’s regional influence, alongside Azerbaijan’s emergence as a more autonomous and confident regional power. The paper argues that Azerbaijan’s evolving strategic posture, underpinned by its alliance with Türkiye, its central role in transregional connectivity projects, and its relative economic resilience, has empowered Baku to engage Moscow in a more assertive and transactional relationship. At the same time, areas of interdependence remain, particularly in trade, transport infrastructure, and close humanitarian-cultural contacts, posing both risks and opportunities. The paper concludes that the future of Azerbaijan-Russia relations will hinge on Moscow’s ability to internalize the new power realities in the South Caucasus. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Senior Research Fellow at the APRI Armenia

Armenia’s pivotal 2026 looms: a year that will test fragile peace efforts with Azerbaijan and Turkey, redefine Yerevan’s ties with the EU and Russia, and unfold amid deepening political and societal polarization.
The year 2026 could be crucial for Armenia, significantly influencing both the foreign and domestic policy trajectory of the country. Externally, the main developments to monitor are the Armenia–Azerbaijan and Armenia–Turkey normalization processes. Will the August 2025 Washington Declaration bring the restoration of all regional communications – including the opening of the Armenia-Turkey border and the signature of an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement – or will it meet the fate of previous, unsuccessful attempts to establish lasting peace and security in the South Caucasus? READ MORE

By Shanthie Mariet D’SOUZA, PhD, founder & president, Mantraya Institute for Strategic Studies (MISS)

Record trade and closer ties with Taipei mark New Delhi’s shift from caution to assertiveness.
In 2024, for the first time ever, bilateral trade between India and Taiwan exceeded US$10 billion. And in the past six months alone, governments and businesses in the two countries have agreed on multipledeals that bring their semiconductor, tech, artificial intelligence, and industrial sectors even closer together, along with supply chains. These new trade partnerships support Taiwan’s “New Southbound Policy” and India’s “Act East” and “Make in India” policies, with Taiwan alone investing US$4.5 billion in India since February 2024. While the surge in Taiwanese investment in Indian companies is grounded in the economic dimension of the relationship, there is another dynamic taking place. Like most countries, New Delhi does not officially recognise Taipei. Yet its compliance with the “One China principle” – the condition set by Beijing that nations must diplomatically acknowledge there is only one Chinese government and must not establish official contacts with Taiwan – has become more nuanced. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Senior Research Fellow at the APRI Armenia

The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020 and ensuing geopolitical developments revealed the paradoxes behind Türkiye’s motivations in the South Caucasus. This report examines the main directions of Türkiye’s foreign policy in the region, building on insights from desktop research, 18 interviews, and other convening opportunities.
Key findings:

• The importance of the South Caucasus for Türkiye is underestimated. The region has strong significance for Ankara from both a geopolitical and geoeconomic perspective.
• Türkiye’s policy in the South Caucasus is, and will likely remain, based on its strategic alliance with Azerbaijan and can be articulated as an “Azerbaijan first” policy.
• Azerbaijan–Türkiye ties consist of heavy interdependencies in many fields, from political to social and economic, rather than a “big brother/small brother” dynamic. If land access from Azerbaijan to Nakhijevan—and then directly to Türkiye—via Armenia’s Syunik region is established, Türkiye may lose any incentive to continue normalization and open borders with Armenia.
• Türkiye sees Russia as “an unavoidable evil” that will remain a constant factor in South Caucasus geopolitics, and Ankara aims to manage its relationship with Moscow, establish a Russia–Türkiye condominium, and substantially limit the presence and influence of the US, the EU, and NATO in the region. READ MORE

By Shanthie Mariet D’SOUZA, PhD, founder & president, Mantraya Institute for Strategic Studies (MISS)

Strategic autonomy worked when Washington was indulgent. Now India must choose what matters more. It may be no more than an annual ritual: the Indian Prime Minister and the Russian President meeting each other alternately in either country. However, the current geopolitical churn creates a special interest in Vladimir Putin’s impending visit to India, tentatively planned for the first week of December 2025, to attend the 23rd India-Russia Summit. He is expected to devote a large part of his meeting with Narendra Modi to finding ways to keep the strategic relationship alive amid New Delhi’s continuing attempts to arrive at a compromise trade deal with Donald Trump’s America. Unlike Putin’s India visit in 2021, which was a quieter affair, New Delhi is now laying out the trappings to greet the Russian President. Although the visit may not witness the grand optics mostly reserved for US leaders, a slew of preparatory visits by senior officials from either side are underway to make Putin’s official trip appear out of the ordinary. READ MORE

By Shanthie Mariet D’SOUZA, PhD, founder & president, Mantraya Institute for Strategic Studies (MISS)

Existential differences and longstanding distrust make the current normalisation of relations deeply unstable.
New Delhi’s optimism about Trump’s return has given way to punitive tariffs, stalled negotiations, and diplomatic drift.
For the past several months, Indian negotiators have been trying, albeit unsuccessfully, to finalise a trade deal with the United States. On several occasions, negotiators, including India’s commerce minister and its chief economic adviser, have hinted at an impending breakthrough. Advanced-stage negotiations have been cited, or even an “intuition” that the bilateral trade agreement could be signed before 30 November, and that it would lower the punitive 50% tariff imposed by the Trump administration on Indian imports to about 10-15%. While “hope still floats” in New Delhi, there is an overall assessment that India-US relations are in a downward spiral and will struggle to recover. The non-conclusion of the trade deal is an unexpected development for the government in New Delhi, which seemed to have preferred the return of a Republican administration in Washington, one that doesn’t make human rights, religious and press freedoms important pillars of its foreign policy. However, after taking office, Trump unveiled a vastly different India policy that essentially wipes out the fond memories of his first term. READ MORE

By Shanthie Mariet D’SOUZA, PhD, founder & president, Mantraya Institute for Strategic Studies (MISS)

Where once Islamabad and Kabul could calm tensions between them bilaterally, external mediation was needed this time around. There have been three ceasefire agreements between Afghanistan and Pakistan in less than two weeks. Two agreements collapsed or were violated before a final one was reached in Doha on October 19, which has held as of writing. These fragile, imperfect, yet frequent arrangements to cease hostilities, however, reveal three different dynamics between the two friends-turned-foes: first, the cordiality of the past is no longer a restraining factor for carrying out military measures against one another; second, these measures and counter-measures, however, won’t reach a point of truly destructive escalation; and yet, third, both countries are no longer able to resolve their differences bilaterally and need the assistance of external mediators indicating deep schisms and distrust in the relationship. READ MORE

By Shanthie Mariet D’SOUZA, PhD, founder & president, Mantraya Institute for Strategic Studies (MISS)

On September 21, the Taliban rebuffed U.S. President Donald Trump for the second time in the last nine months. A day earlier, Trump had demanded control of Bagram air base in Afghanistan and had even threatened “bad things” if his demand wasn’t entertained. The Taliban spokesperson was categorical in his September 23 reply: “We will never agree to bargain away or hand over any part of our country.” On being summoned for an emergency meeting by Emir Hibatullah Akhunzada following Trump’s comments, Taliban defence and foreign ministers and intelligence chiefs rushed to Kandahar. There were separate meetings as well among the Taliban leadership. The recent rejection of Trump’s vague threats didn’t occur in a vacuum. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Senior Research Fellow at the APRI Armenia

Armenia and China established a strategic partnership on August 31, 2025, in the margins of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit held in Tianjin, China. The establishment of a strategic partnership with China can be seen as another step within the Armenian Government’s “balanced and balancing foreign policy” or “pivot to the world,” as first articulated by the Armenia’s Secretary of the Security Council during the 2024 Applied Policy Research Institute (APRI) Armenia Forum. As part of its “pivot to the world,” a few weeks prior to the SCO summit Armenia applied for full membership of the organization (currently Yerevan is a dialogue partner) and in spring 2025, the Armenian Parliament adopted a law on launching the process of accession of the Republic of Armenia to the European Union. READ MORE

By Sultan ZAHIDOV, Leading Advisor at the AIR Center, Baku and Senior Lecturer at the Baku State University

For decades, establishing lasting peace in the South Caucasus has been one of the most persistent challenges for regional states and international actors alike. Straddling vital geostrategic lines of Eurasia, this region has long been a geopolitical “shatter belt” — a zone where the interests of great and regional powers collide. External actors have repeatedly sought to exploit these divisions, employing “divide et impera” strategies that, rather than resolving disputes, have often exacerbated tensions. Not without reason, renowned scholar Thomas de Waal describes the South Caucasus as “the lands in between,” emphasizing its role as a crossroads of competing powers. According to Barry Buzan’s ‘overlay’ concept, the weakening and decline of great powers paves the way for the resurgence of past conflicts that had previously been de-escalated under the authority of the dominant power. Indeed, the collapse of the Soviet Union reopened the Pandora’s box of frozen conflicts, none more consequential than the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict. READ MORE

By Yunis GURBANOV, PhD, Senior Advisor at the AIR Center, Baku

The Alaska summit highlighted the discordant divergence between Washington and Moscow after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and exposed the limits of summit diplomacy in the context of a grinding war. President Trump reaffirmed America's formal commitment to Ukraine's sovereignty and NATO's deterrent stance, but his words were typically qualified by continual calls for a "realistic settlement" with Moscow. This contrasted sharply with the State Department’s prior line, suggesting internal tensions within Washington’s approach. President Putin, for his part, sought to capitalize on these uncertainties: he promoted Russia's military successes as irreversible facts on the ground, demanded Western recognition of occupied land, and framed Moscow's actions as a defensive reaction against NATO "encirclement. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Senior Research Fellow at the APRI Armenia

Turkey-Russia relations are typically based on compartmentalization. They simultaneously compete and cooperate in various regions, separating the areas in which their interests are overlapping from those where they are in competition. This concept was the base of their competing relations in Syria until the demise of Assad regime in 2024, and mutual interactions in post-Gaddafi Libya. Another aspect of compartmentalization is the conscious separation of economy and geopolitics: they have been developing economic cooperation while competing in geopolitics. Economic cooperation is significant for both Russia and Turkey, considering Russian gas and oil imported by Turkey and the construction by the Russian state nuclear energy company ROSATOM of a nuclear power plant in Akkuyu, southern Turkey. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

On August 8, Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev and U.S. President Donald Trump endorsed a memorandum of understanding with seven points, affirming their commitment to finalize a peace agreement. At the same time, bilateral agreements were signed between the U.S. and each country separately. According to Narek Sukiasyan, a research fellow at the Center for Culture and Civilization Studies at Yerevan State University, the clauses in the memorandum carry considerable geopolitical weight. Most directly, they mandate the disbanding of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, which was co-chaired by the U.S., France and Russia to help resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict peacefully. Baku has marginalized the group since 2020. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

President Donald Trump is right to describe the U.S.-mediated summit between the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders on August 8 in Washington as a historic event. It is historic not only for its contribution to the peace process between the two countries, but also for the significant reshaping of the South Caucasus’ security order that it has set in motion. The day after the summit, the region woke up to a new reality – one markedly different from what had existed until recently. Undoubtedly, the most significant outcome of the Washington summit for the people of the South Caucasus was the agreements signed between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The two countries initialled the peace agreement, agreed to sign it following the removal of territorial claims against Azerbaijan from Armenia’s state constitution, jointly appealed for the dissolution of the Minsk Group of the OSCE, and agreed on the opening of the Zangezur corridor. READ MORE

By Yunis GURBANOV, PhD, Senior Advisor at the AIR Center, Baku

The high-level encounter between Russian and Ukrainian representatives took place on 23 July 2025 in Istanbul. Turkey hosted the encounter with significant diplomatic weight, focusing on limited ceasefire corridors, the exchange of prisoners, and grain exports through the Black Sea. Though apparently narrow in scope, the gathering represents a rebalancing in wider geopolitics. Turkey's mediating role in Istanbul facilitates Ankara's renewed desire to be at the centre of regional diplomacy, particularly considering that Turkey has just hosted Russia-Ukraine direct negotiations in 2025 as a testament to its resumed mediating interests. On the other hand, Western leaders remained unimpressed by Moscow's long-term intentions, particularly in light of Russia's unyielding ultimatums in negotiations and ongoing military belligerency, calling into question its genuine interest in arriving at a settlement other than temporary tactical respite or concession. READ MORE

By Shanthie Mariet D’SOUZA, PhD, founder & president, Mantraya Institute for Strategic Studies (MISS)

While the intention to reset China-India bilateral relations seems real, both the drivers and the outcomes need a careful analysis.
We live in a world of constant flux. Nations, over time, discover a variety of reasons – geopolitical or otherwise – to become friends or foes, based on their national interests. China-India relations aren’t immune from this truism. The trend in the past decade has seen the two neighbours embracing each other and then falling out. And after years of bickering and contestation, the time has come again for them to explore yet another round of engagement. Is the current rapprochement merely opportunistic and temporary? Or is it geared toward a long-term solution of their contestations driven by extraneous factors and geopolitical uncertainty?
On July 23, the 34th meeting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on China-India Border Affairs took place in New Delhi. The meeting discussed issues relating to strengthening border management and maintaining calm along their contested border. More concrete discussions on the “boundary question” are expected to be held when the special representatives of both countries meet for the 24th time later this year. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Senior Research Fellow at the APRI Armenia

Profound shifts in the geopolitical dynamics of the South Caucasus, driven by the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and the onset of the Russia-Ukraine War, have shaped the Armenian government’s pursuit of foreign policy diversification. This report analyses key developments in and around Armenian foreign policy from November 2020—the end of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War—through March 2025. The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, the onset of the Russia-Ukraine War in 2022, and Azerbaijan’s military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 disrupted the regional status quo. In light of the repeated incursions by Azerbaijan and in the absence of a tangible response from Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Armenian government intensified its foreign policy diversification efforts. It sought to deepen diplomatic and military cooperation with new and existing partners, notably India, France, the EU, and the US, while opening multiple embassies worldwide. READ MORE

By Shanthie Mariet D’SOUZA, PhD, founder & president, Mantraya Institute for Strategic Studies (MISS)

Yoga, which originated in ancient India, features many asanas (physical postures) focused on enabling the human body to find a fine balance, while stretching the limbs to achieve maximum flexibility. India uses yoga as a tool of its soft power, celebrating International Yoga Day on June 21 every year, and the present Indian foreign policy making often mirrors such asanas. When faced with stark situations such as taking sides between warring states, New Delhi tends to fall back on a balancing act, avoiding taking sides and advocating diplomacy and de-escalation. However, finding the right balance in matters of statecraft is a tough task, particularly when one side has been perceived to be favoured over the other in the past, but those warm relations are no longer the same. India’s stance on the Israel-Iran conflict contains many such contradictions. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

The Informal Summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), held on May 20-21, 2025, in Budapest, Hungary, marked a significant milestone in the organisation’s growing geopolitical influence. Hosted by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, the summit brought together leaders from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Türkiye, and Uzbekistan, alongside observer states Hungary, Turkmenistan, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This gathering, the first OTS summit hosted by an observer state, underscored Hungary’s role as a bridge between the Turkic world and Europe, reflecting the theme “Meeting Point of East and West”. The summit culminated in the adoption of the Budapest Declaration, a strategic roadmap that reaffirmed the OTS’s commitment to unity, cooperation, and addressing global challenges. This event highlighted the organisation’s evolution into a formidable geopolitical player, particularly for Central Asian states and Azerbaijan, as they navigate complex regional dynamics to safeguard their independence and counter threats to their security. READ MORE

By Shanthie Mariet D’SOUZA, PhD, founder & president, Mantraya Institute for Strategic Studies (MISS)

Providing humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people has been a tool used by India for both opposing the Taliban in the past and engaging the Taliban now.
It’s springtime in India-Taliban relations. On May 16, 160 Afghan trucks carrying dry fruits crossed over into India from Pakistan, across the checkpoint in Attari. Although the border crossing is closed for Indo-Pak trade and movement of people since the brief conflict between the two nations in May 2025, it seems Indo-Afghan land trade is now open, as long as Pakistan does not play spoiler and create hurdles. In the last week of April 2025, India resumed granting visas to Afghan citizens across multiple categories, four years after suspending all visa services following the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover of Kabul. READ MORE

By Vusal GULIYEV, Policy Advisor at the Center of Analysis of International Relations and Head of Shanghai Office at AZEGLOB Consulting Group

Azerbaijan and Vietnam formally elevated their 33-year diplomatic relationship to a strategic partnership during General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Tô Lâm’s visit to Baku from May 7 to 8. After signing a joint declaration to form a strategic alliance, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Tô Lâm established numerous cooperation agreements across various sectors, including energy, defence, and culture. Aliyev described the pact as a “very serious political document” that upgrades relations, pledging to turn the signed agreements into concrete projects. Tô Lâm likewise hailed the visit as a new era in the history of relations between the two countries, noting that deepened ties would leverage each side’s strengths for mutual development. This first visit by a Vietnamese Communist Party leader to Azerbaijan underscored Hanoi’s commitment to broader engagement with the Caucasus. READ MORE

By Shanthie Mariet D’SOUZA, PhD, founder & president, Mantraya Institute for Strategic Studies (MISS)

The objective of connecting the Central Asian economies with those of South Asia has, for a very long time, been a much sought-after, and yet unattained, goal. Both regions see immense potential in connectivity projects that can contribute significantly to their national economies and bind countries in a mutually beneficial economic framework. While the Central Asian states have been at the forefront of pushing such projects forward, progress has been frustratingly slow. Uzbekistan has taken on a leadership role in the region and made Afghanistan the centrepiece of its connectivity projects with South Asia. Will India, the biggest economy in South Asia, bite the bait? READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Senior Research Fellow at the APRI Armenia

Russia is highly likely to remain a driver of geopolitical dynamics in the South Caucasus for the foreseeable future. The potential ceasefire in Ukraine may shift Moscow’s resources back to the South Caucasus and thus make Russia’s position stronger. The relations built since 1991 has given Russia leverage with Armenia, including the presence of Russian military base and border troops in Armenia, and Armenia’s membership of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), while Armenia was providing an opportunity for Russia to project power in the South Caucasus and foment its position as the strongest external player in the region. Over the past four years, relations between Armenia and Russia have changed significantly, transforming Moscow from a strategic ally into a problematic partner. Both sides now harbor a lengthy list of grievances against the other. With the potential new chapter in Ukraine also comes an opportunity for both countries to reset their bilateral relationship and find a new modus operandi. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On April 25, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas paid a visit to Azerbaijan. This was the first visit of the EU’s top diplomat to Baku in the past nine years. Both sides gave positive messages during the visit about the existing situation in bilateral relations and future prospects. President Ilham Aliyev reaffirmed Azerbaijan’s position as a dependable EU partner, drawing attention to the Southern Gas Corridor’s steady supply of natural gas to Europe over the past four years. Currently, ten European nations – eight of them EU members – receive Azerbaijani gas, positioning Baku as a major contributor to the continent’s energy security. Aliyev also pointed to effective collaboration under the Southern Gas Corridor Advisory Council and noted promising opportunities in renewable energy. Azerbaijan’s involvement in advancing the Trans-Caspian Energy Corridor and joint Black Sea energy projects with countries like Georgia, Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria was also underscored. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Senior Research Fellow at the APRI Armenia

Since Armenia gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, normalizing relations with Turkey has been one of the country’s top foreign-policy priorities. The rationale behind this has been both economic, to end the blockade and facilitate access to Turkish Mediterranean ports, and political, to drive a wedge in the Azerbaijan–Turkey strategic partnership. Armenia took steps towards normalization in 2008 and 2009. As a result of intensive negotiations, Armenia and Turkey signed two protocols in Zurich in 2009 to open their borders and establish diplomatic relations. However, Turkey did not ratify them, under intense pressure from Azerbaijan. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

With the disintegration of the Syrian state after 2011, the Kurds in northeast Syria became key players in shaping the country’s future. The recent agreement between Damascus and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) further consolidated their role. However, the future of the Syrian state remains uncertain amid the horrors of the massacres of Alawites on the Syrian coast by radical Islamist factions affiliated with the new administration, Israel’s aspirations to encourage secessionist tendencies among the Druze community in Syria’s south, and Turkey’s strategic interests in Syria, which seem to collide with American- Israeli interests. This article sheds light on the agreement between Syria’s President Ahmad al-Sharaa and SDF General Mazloum Abdi and assess Turkey’s ambitions amid growing domestic and regional uncertainties shaping Syria’s future. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On March 6, the office of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that Israel is engaged in discussions with the United States “to establish a strong foundation for trilateral cooperation between Israel, Azerbaijan, and the U.S.”. This statement coincided with debates in the Knesset on “Upgrading the Strategic Alliance between Israel and Azerbaijan”. The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) highlighted Azerbaijan’s role as a “strategic ally in the Caucasus region,” with bilateral cooperation spanning security, trade, technology, and energy. Israeli National Missions Minister Orit Strock, speaking on behalf of the government, emphasized the unique and long-standing friendship between Israel and Azerbaijan. READ MORE