By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Senior Research Fellow at the APRI Armenia

The June 2025 12-day Iran–Israel War and US military strikes targeting Iranian nuclear sites created shock waves in the Middle East and beyond. Iran and Israel exchanged strikes twice in 2024, but these were limited and mostly symbolic operations. While the war did not solve critical issues between Iran and Israel, and there is a possibility of another escalation, it demonstrated the volatile nature of Middle Eastern geopolitics, shaped by evolving balance of power. Armenia is a neighbour of Iran, and this fact alone is enough to mean that Armenia will be affected by any Iran–Israel confrontation. However, there are other factors that can amplify the implications for Armenia of a potential long-term war against Iran. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Over the past few weeks, security events have dramatically accelerated Israel’s aggression on Lebanon. On October 8, 2023, Hezbollah, a paramilitary political party in Lebanon (also known as the Islamic Resistance) backed by Iran, opened a front against Israel to assist Hamas in its conflict with Israel following its “al-Aqsa Storm” operation. The Lebanese front remained “managed” as Israel and Hezbollah engaged in limited clashes. This equation changed starting on September 17, 2024. Along with its fight against Hamas and the destruction of Gaza, Israel shifted its focus to Hezbollah and started bombing Lebanon, destroying the party’s infrastructure in southern Beirut, South Lebanon and Beqaa near the border with Syria. READ MORE

By Alan WHITEHORN, Professor Emeritus in Political Science, The Royal Military College of Canada

Armenia and the South Caucasus were historically parts of the former Soviet Union, and are often considered, in geopolitical terms, to be in the so-called Moscow-influenced “Russia’s near abroad”. It might be useful, however, to recognize the significant connections of the South Caucasus to the Middle East. In fact, Armenia is relatively close geographically (under 1,000 km) to each of the capital cities of Teheran (Iran), Baghdad (Iraq), and Ankara (Turkiye) and not much farther from Israel and Lebanon (under 1,300 km). In terms of international affairs and recent conflict Turkey has been a crucial military ally of Azerbaijan during the latter’s wars with Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) in 2020 and 2023. A lesser-known fact is that, over the previous decade, Israel has been a major weapons’ supplier of Azerbaijan, particularly advanced drones that proved critical for Baku’s swift and decisive victory in the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan war, and its 2023 recapture of Nagorno-Karabakh, which displaced over 100,000 civilians, virtually all of the local Armenian population. READ MORE

The Central Election Commission held a meeting and a series of events today, July 26th. The primary agenda item was the preparation and high-level accomplishment of the upcoming elections for the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis and the Councils of People's Deputies in full compliance with the Constitution and laws.
According to Article 128 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, elections for the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis and the Councils of People's Deputies are scheduled to take place on the first Sunday of the third ten-day period of October in the year their term expires. Considering that the term of the deputies of the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis and the Councils of People's Deputies ends in 2024, the elections will be held on October 27th of this year, and the election campaign will begin on July 26th, as decided by the Central Election Commission. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

After the end of the Cold War, Turkish decision-makers adopted a “top-down” strategy that capitalized on the dramatic shift in international arms production. Turkey aimed to look eastward to cooperate with China and Russia as its threat perception changed. In the second half of the 1990s, Turkey became a prominent Israeli arms purchaser. There were numerous factors behind this. First, Israeli weapons were a high-tech and credible alternative to NATO weapons. Second, unlike Europe and the U.S., Israeli arms purchases were not conditioned to Turkey’s domestic developments (democratization, human rights, minority rights…). Third, Israel and Turkey’s foreign policies overlapped in critical areas in the Middle East, aiming to contain Syrian and Iranian interests. Finally, deep relations with Israel were expected to be rewarded by pro-Israeli lobbying groups in the U.S. to counter the Armenian and Greek lobbies. READ MORE

By Fuad Shahbazov, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On January 28, 2024, masked assailants attacked a Roman Catholic church in Istanbul, killing one person. Shortly afterward, the Islamic State, through its official Amaq News Agency, claimed responsibility. Turkish police detained 47 people, most Central Asian nationals. The incident shed light on the growing presence in Turkey of a Central Asian offshoot of the Islamic State group known as ISIS-K for Khorasan, once a large portion of the Persian Empire now divided among Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asian states. The January 28 assault was the group’s first successful attack in Turkey since January 1, 2017, when jihadists invaded an Istanbul nightclub, killing 39 people and wounding nearly 80.
Since then, Turkish security forces have launched mass counter-operations against ISIS suspects in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. The operations appear to have deterred deadly terrorist attacks in large urban and border areas and to have depleted the militants’ financial resources. With the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, ISIS-K suspended overseas activities to focus more on Afghanistan and try to undermine the Taliban, which resumed control over the country after the Americans left. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On January 19, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan called for a new constitution in a meeting with senior officials from the Armenian Ministry of Justice. Pashinyan asserted that Armenia needs “a new constitution, not constitutional changes,” adding that the new foundational document would make the country “more competitive and viable in the new geopolitical and regional environment” (Azatutyun.am, January 19). He highlighted that the new constitution would maintain the present parliamentary system and underscored “external security” and “internationally recognized sovereign territory” as the main issues to be addressed. Mutual respect for one another’s territorial integrity remains a sticking point in peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. If Yerevan proceeds with Pashinyan’s proposal, the new constitution will eliminate certain hurdles to signing a peace treaty with Baku. READ MORE

Farangiz Avazbekova, Chief inspector of the Agency for the Development of Public Service under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan; Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Law

The social and political activity of women and their participation in public administration bodies in the process of making important decisions are crucial for the development of the country. Sociological research has shown that women’s high efficiency, rapid and persistent decision-making, responsiveness to job completion, and prompt provision of executive discipline allow them to perform their duties effectively in the civil service. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

The war between Hamas and Israel war has triggered strong anti-Israel sentiments in the region and heightened fears of a broader conflict engulfing actors such as Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. Worried that the conflict in Gaza could escalate into a regional confrontation, the US has dispatched two aircraft carrier strike groups within range, including additional troops and military advisors.
But alongside tough rhetoric, the violence in Gaza has renewed apparent pragmatism by important regional states such as Iran and Turkey. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has openly slammed Israel's bombings of the Palestinian coastal enclave. On the other hand, Ankara has avoided issuing direct threats against Tel Aviv and, in an apparent unusual move, allegedly distanced itself from Hamas in the aftermath of the Palestinian movement’s surprise attack on Israel last month. READ MORE

Taking into account the latest media reports on the new outbreak of hostilities on the Line of Contact in Karabakh (called Artsakh in Armenian) between local Armenian forces and the Azerbaijani military, I am gravely concerned about the loss of life and the indiscriminate destruction of civilian assets. As the Founder of the European Geopolitical Forum, an organisation which embraces peaceful means of conflict resolution, and which has been actively involved in finding a reasonable, sound and long-term solution to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh for some ten years, I call for an immediate end to all hostilities and a swift return of the parties to the negotiation table. I am encouraged by the breaking news of a Russian-mediated ceasefire. I call for the immediate, non-conditional resumption of the internationally mediated dialogue between Baku and representatives of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh. I also call on the Russian Federation, the United States and the European Union to actively demand peaceful settlement of the Karabakh conflict and to ensure that the ceasefire is respected without any form of deviation.

Dr Marat Terterov,
Founder, European Geopolitical Forum

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

On October 7, 2023, Palestinian Islamist militant group Hamas launched operation “Al-Aqsa Flood,” aiming to destroy the Israeli army positions near Gaza and capture as many soldiers as possible, in order to exchange them with the almost 7,000 Palestinians detained in Israeli prisons. The operation created a shockwave in Israeli society, killing more than 1,000 soldiers and civilians. As a result, Israelis started indiscriminately bombing Gaza, killing civilians and threatening ethnic cleansing through a land invasion. The danger that the escalation will turn into a regional conflict involving Iran and Hezbollah is high. Such a step would surely have devastating consequences for the region and a domino effect beyond the Middle East. If Israel, which is Azerbaijan’s military partner and Iran’s regional enemy, was involved in a war of attrition in Gaza or a regional escalation, it would become isolated from the events in the South Caucasus. READ MORE

Interview by “Georgia Today” with Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

Georgia is not ready to defend itself if Moscow decides to invade again. And this is a very big weakness, one which should have been solved years ago and remains unresolved to this day…In Georgia, they don’t bother to ask themselves difficult questions…it’s something Georgian politicians seem to be averse to – Eugene Kogan, a researcher at the Vienna Institute of International Politics, an expert on defence and security issues in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, who has been living in Georgia for the past 10 years, told RFE/RL’s Georgian Service. We spoke to him about the role of Georgia in the region, territorial integrity, Karabakh, and the new war in the Middle East. We started with the Israel-Hamas conflict. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On September 19, Azerbaijan launched a large-scale offensive against the self-declared Nagorno Karabakh Republic with only one goal: to finish with that republic. The Azerbaijani attack was not a surprise to anyone. At least since the beginning of 2023, Azerbaijan has stated clearly and loudly that Baku will not tolerate the status quo that emerged after the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war and will do everything possible to destroy the Nagorno Karabakh Republic. Azerbaijan was also clear that it would reach its goal quickly. Since the beginning of September 2023, as Azerbaijan started to concentrate troops along the line of contact, it was clear the military offensive would take place very soon. Armenia knew that Russia knew that, the EU and the US knew that, and Nagorno Karabakh authorities knew that. What were the positions of the sides regarding the upcoming offensive of Azerbaijan? READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

The socio-economic crisis was one of the causes of the disintegration of centralized governments in Syria and Iraq in 2011 and the emergence of radical militants in rural areas. These militants were motivated by anger towards the urban elite, who for decades neglected rural areas. As civil wars and political instability hit Syria and Iraq, many young rural people were recruited by these groups, who were financed by regional countries or non-state actors. In 2013, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was founded with the aim to establish an Islamic kingdom (caliphate) in the region. […] After the dissolution of ISIS in late 2019, the movement went underground, yet today it is taking advantage of the financial crisis in Syria and making a comeback. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On September 9, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan spoke on the phone with the leaders of France, Iran, Georgia and Germany, as well as US Secretary of State Antony Blinken. In a manner that resembled his outreach to various world leaders at the beginning of the Second Karabakh War (September 7–November 10, 2020), the Armenian premier warned against intensifying tensions in the region and stated his readiness for immediate talks with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev without preconditions. Pashinyan’s words came on the heels of several setbacks that threaten to derail Armenian-Azerbaijani peace negotiations and may lead to another military conflict.
Both sides accuse each other of a military build-up along their shared border in preparation for an offensive. According to the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry, a military threat also emanates from the continued presence of Armenian troops in Karabakh, despite Yerevan’s earlier pledge to withdraw them by September 2022. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

As the humanitarian crisis deepens in the self-proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic and tens of thousands of people have found themselves in a daily struggle to get basic food, hygiene products, and other goods, discussions are underway in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and within the international community about ways out. Azerbaijan has its vision of the situation. According to Baku, if the international community, including Armenia, recognizes Nagorno Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan, then no one should reject supplying goods to Nagorno Karabakh from Azerbaijan. Many in Baku view this option as the first step towards the gradual reintegration of Nagorno Karabakh into Azerbaijan's economic and later political sphere. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

As the sides are coming closer to the signature of a peace agreement, steps should be taken to solve the issues along the Armenia – Azerbaijan state border and the line of contact. The population of the self–proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Armenians and Azerbaijanis living along the state border have the inalienable right to live in a secure environment while external actors are moving forward with their geopolitical ambitions. In this context, a concrete measure to ease tensions can be the establishment of an incident prevention and response mechanism.

The restart of intensive Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiations in May 2023 gave hope that an Armenia – Azerbaijan peace agreement is within reach. Meetings in Washington, Brussels, Moscow, and Chisinau seem to have paved the way for a deal by the end of 2023. Officials from both countries started to sound more optimistic regarding the prospects of peace and stability in the South Caucasus. The Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers will have another round of talks in Washington in the next days, and the President of the European Council Michel will host Prime Minister Pashinyan and President Aliyev in Brussels on 21 July. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war has significantly changed the balance of power in the South Caucasus, increasing the role and influence of Turkey. The direct involvement of Turkey in the war and the lack of action by Russia to prevent this NATO member state from challenging the Russian zone of influence in the post-Soviet space crushed the basics of the Armenian foreign and security policy. Since the end of the first Nagorno Karabakh war in 1994, Armenian military doctrine has been based on the core belief that Russia will not allow direct Turkish involvement in a new war against Armenia. Thus, Armenia prepared itself for the war with Azerbaijan while outsourcing to Russia the deterrence of Turkey. Meanwhile, this mindset also resulted in a Russia-focused defence and security policy. Armenia was buying weapons mainly from Russia, almost all Armenian officers were studying in Russian military universities, and the structure and operating mode of the Armenian army was solely based on the Russian model. Armenia developed limited defence cooperation with other nations, including the US, Greece, and Poland, and signed its first Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO in 2005. However, these sporadic interactions did not change the basics of Russia-focused foreign and military policy. READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

It is a paradox that two democratic Nordic countries that are willing to join NATO and become interoperable with it are kept at bay by pseudo-democratic NATO member Turkey. As long as this situation persists, Russia strategically has the last laugh. This could have been avoided if the proposed policy recommendations had been implemented by NATO some time ago.
To begin with, it is crucial to recall a preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty (Washington Treaty 1949), namely: ‘The Parties to this Treaty are determined to safeguard the freedom – founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law’. Obviously, these principles have been repeatedly trampled upon by Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan over the last decade. And now, two democratic candidates for NATO membership, Finland and Sweden, have to fulfil conditions virtually imposed by the pseudo-democratic government of Turkey. This is a worrying paradox. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Nagorno Karabakh's future is the most challenging question that Armenia and Azerbaijan face as they seek to move towards the normalisation of relations between them.
Since the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war ended, Armenia and Azerbaijan have launched multi-track negotiations to sign a peace treaty. In 2021 the primary platform for negotiations was Russia, and in 2022 the EU and the US joined the club. Armenia and Azerbaijan discuss several separate but intertwined issues – the signature of the peace treaty, delimitation and demarcation of borders, restoration of communications, and the future of Nagorno Karabakh. All issues are pretty complicated, but Nagorno Karabakh's future is the most challenging question. There are different approaches how to deal with this issue. One approach argues for the inclusion of Nagorno Karabakh in the bilateral peace treaty, while according to another view, the Nagorno Karabakh issue should be separated from discussions on Armenia - Azerbaijan relations. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Over the past few weeks, I participated in multiple international and regional workshops and conferences in Europe and Russia and met with many European, Azerbaijani, Turkish, Iranian and Russian experts and politicians. These opportunities and encounters made me realize that we as Armenians must adapt to a new reality, revise our strategy (if we have one) and try to confront the dangers with the resources that we have. The possibility of a new war with Azerbaijan is very high, but proactive diplomacy and deterrence can postpone a major military clash.
I also realized a change in attitude in many Azerbaijani experts. Of course, we cannot generalize, but from their perspective, Azerbaijanis still firmly believe that the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis has been resolved, which the West and Russia do not agree on. They do not have enough leverage to force their will on Baku, as Azerbaijan is playing its energy card very well for now. Azerbaijanis have come to realize that if they enforce their will over Nagorno-Karabakh and engage in ethnic cleansing, there will be international backlash. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The developments of the last three weeks have proved that Armenia and Azerbaijan are far from signing a peace agreement, at least by the end of 2022. There is a danger that Azerbaijan may interpret this as a failure of the peace process and use this as a "moral justification" to launch a new large-scale aggression. If this happens, it will push Armenia and Azerbaijan further back from any chance to reach an agreement and deepen the mutual mistrust.
In recent months Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiation process passed through several ups and downs. The September 13-14, 2022, Azerbaijani aggression seemed to jeopardize the fragile achievements reached during the three Brussel summits held in April, May, and August 2022. However, immediately after the ceasefire reached on September 14, there was a new push toward reaching a peace agreement. Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers met in New York in late September and Geneva on October 2; Secretary of the Armenian Security Council Armen Grigoryan had a meeting with President Aliyev’s top foreign policy aide Hikmet Hajiyev in Washington on September 27, 2022. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Last week’s aggression by Azerbaijan on Armenia should be viewed from a regional lens, as the conflict imposes a new geopolitical reality not only on Armenia, but also Iran and the wider South Caucasus.

On September 10, 2022, the Defence Minister of Azerbaijan instructed his army to maintain combat readiness to “suppress any Armenian provocations.” Not surprisingly, three days later, Baku launched a full-scale aggression on Armenia’s eastern border, concentrating on Jermuk and using special forces, Israeli and Turkish-made drones and artillery strikes against military and civilian targets. Consequently, Azerbaijan occupied strategic positions near the border, exerting pressure on Armenia’s narrow southern region. The aim of this military operation was to enter Jermuk and force the authorities of Yerevan into another “capitulation.” READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

In recent months, some positive momentum was registered in Armenia-Azerbaijan talks. The sides established national commissions on border delimitation and demarcation, and after a six-months break, the trilateral Armenia-Russia-Azerbaijan commission on restoration of communication resumed its work. According to Russian sources, later confirmed by the Armenian deputy prime minister, the sides achieved significant progress in the negotiations, almost reaching an agreement on the route of the highway, which will connect Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan via the Syunik region of Armenia, as well as on modalities of border and customs control. The agreement to open the Armenia-Turkey land border for the crossing of third country citizens and launch direct air cargo trade between the two countries, achieved during the July 1 meeting of Armenia and Turkey representatives, seemed to add a more positive environment in the South Caucasus geopolitics. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

The second Karabakh war between Azerbaijan and Armenia in September of 2020 opened a new page in the modern history of the post-Soviet region and explicitly changed the geopolitical landscape in the South Caucasus. With Baku regaining control over large swathes of territories, Turkey has obtained a greater role in the region, acting as a guarantor of the ceasefire regime between Azerbaijan-Armenia alongside Russia, whereas Iran’s diminished position has gotten less attention. Indeed, in the post-war period, Tehran saw a steep decline in its regional influence in the Southern Caucasus, losing its direct land route to Armenia and facing the growing influence of Russia, Israel, and Turkey. Prior to the conflict, Iran had long pursued a balanced foreign policy in the region, developing a partnership with Armenia and Azerbaijan, respectively. However, Turkey’s close relations with Azerbaijan since the 1990s prevented Iran from establishing powerful leverage over this country, unlike landlocked Armenia, which has relied on Iran as one of the main economic partners. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

While the world continues to follow the war in Ukraine and the growing tensions in relations between Russia and the West, Armenia and Azerbaijan are ready to launch negotiations to sign a peace treaty. All external powers involved in the region’s geopolitics – Russia, the US, the EU, Turkey, and Iran – support this process. Armenia and Azerbaijan will soon launch three separate, though interconnected, processes: the start of the work of the bilateral border delimitation and demarcation commission, the restoration of communications infrastructure, and the launch of negotiations on a peace treaty. These issues are discussed on two parallel platforms – Armenia-Azerbaijan-EU and Armenia-Azerbaijan-Russia. Both Russia and the EU support the start of work on all three tracks. READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

Moscow and Beijing are likely to discover that their initial joy over the US withdrawal from Afghanistan may be premature. Afghanistan under the Taliban remains divided, insecure and uncertain about its current and future path. Without stability and security, neither Beijing nor Moscow will provide economic assistance while the international community will continue to shun Afghanistan.
Russia’s Presidential Envoy to Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, noted that “The Taliban were easier to negotiate with than the old “puppet government” of the exiled President Ashraf Ghani.” The latter was seen by, and from Moscow, as a puppet of the West and contacts that Russia maintained with Hamid Karzai’s successor were either downgraded or revised. At the same time, contacts between Russia and the Taliban only increased. With the West’s departure, Moscow is seizing up the opportunity indirectly to recognise the authority of the Taliban, which it officially designated as a terrorist organisation back in 2003 though without burning its bridges with the militant group. READ MORE.

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

As large-scale hostilities continue in Ukraine, politicians, geopolitical experts and international media outlets seek to assess the outcomes and implications of the conflict. When Russia launched its “special military operation” on February 24, the widespread assumption was that Russia planned a blitzkrieg to take major Ukrainian cities within days or maximum weeks. The narrative changed as the first week of hostilities passed with no significant Russian successes. Experts and commentators started to claim that the Russian plan failed due to miscalculations and stiff resistance of the Ukrainians. According to these assessments, Russian President Vladimir Putin was misinformed by his advisors and generals, who promised him that many Ukrainians would meet Russian troops with flowers and that the “special military operation” would be an “easy evening walk.” According to this narrative, facing a different reality, at the beginning of March 2022, Putin started to look for ways out of the mess hastily and end the war. READ MORE

By Alan Whitehorn, Professor Emeritus in Political Science, The Royal Military College of Canada

Without a doubt, Russia’s leader Vladimir Putin is the greatest factor in the risk of war between Russia and Ukraine. Yet paradoxically, Putin is perhaps the best hope for peace in the South Caucasus, at least as far as Azerbaijan and Armenia are concerned. The Georgian situation is, however, another matter. But one should take one step at a time in this exceptionally dangerous and conflict-prone region.
The recent 2020 Karabakh War between Azerbaijan and Armenia was, in effect, a continuation of the bitter 1990s ethno-religious territorial war over Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) that emerged between the two newly independent states in the midst of the break-up of the Soviet Union. The 1990s conflict produced thousands of casualties and hundreds of thousands of displaced civilian ethnic minority refugees. It was a humanitarian catastrophe for families on both sides of the border. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The developments of the last year proved that assessments according to which by taking some 8500 square km of territories in the 2020 Karabakh war, Azerbaijan will be satisfied and an era of peaceful development will be launched for Armenians, were highly exaggerated, and had little semblance to reality.
Since the end of the 2020 Karabakh war, Armenia has faced a new, harsh reality along its borders with Azerbaijan. Some in Armenia hoped that after taking back most of the territories which Baku lost during the first Karabakh war of 1992-1994, an era of regional peace would start in the South Caucasus, while Azerbaijan would agree to continue negotiations to fix the status of Nagorno Karabakh within its 1988 borders. Baku was quite quick to dampen such perceptions. Azerbaijan established an economic region of Karabakh in July 2021 and started to aggressively push forward the narrative that war had ended not only the conflict, but Nagorno Karabakh itself, and thus it was senseless to negotiate over the status of a non-existing entity. READ MORE

By Fuad Shahbazov, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

Half a year after the Russian-brokered ceasefire agreement was signed between Azerbaijan and Armenia ending the 44-day war in Karabakh, peace in the complex region is not on the horizon. A new stage of discontent and harsh statements came last week after Azerbaijani Armed Forces reportedly crossed the border with Armenia in the Syunik province and advanced around 3 kilometres by Sev Lake. Yerevan dubbed this action as an explicit provocation and an attempt to occupy Armenian territory, whereas Baku denied the accusations, stating that Azerbaijani border guards established a military control point at the heights around the lake without advancing into Armenian territories. READ MORE

By Eugene Kogan, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

The bilateral Israeli-Greek military and defence industry cooperation was not created in a vacuum, but is a by-product of the steadily deteriorating Israeli-Turkish relations which include two important events: the famous World Economic Forum incident in Davos on January 29th, 2009 and the Mavi Marmara incident on May 31st, 2010. The Davos incident was further aggravated by the Mavi Marmara incident, which left ten Turkish citizens dead after clashing with Israeli commandos as the latter boarded the ship which was trying to break the Gaza blockade. Moreover, the military component of Israeli-Turkish relations, which used to be the backbone of the relations, is still missing and is unlikely to reappear in the near future. READ MORE.

By Alan Whitehorn, Professor Emeritus in Political Science, The Royal Military College of Canada

Just when you think the war is over, it actually is not. Multi-generational families are haunted by the dead. There are too many displaced persons, multitudes of refugee children uprooted from schools and homes, and continued mistreatment of POWs. The major economic dislocations and massive war debts are part of the ongoing and mounting negative tally. The competing legal terms national self-determination vs territorial integrity are brandished about in fervent ideological battles that further entrench the hardened positions of two combatant sides. READ MORE

By Eugene Kogan, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

A joint initiative of Romanian President Klaus Iohannis and Polish President Andrzej Duda, known as the ‘Bucharest Nine', was launched in November 2015 and laid a foundation for foreign and security policy meetings and discussions. As the next step, the Warsaw NATO Summit in July 2016 accelerated military-to-military cooperation. As a result, the initiative brought Romanian troops to Poland and Polish troops to Romania on a rotational basis in March 2017. In addition, their pivotal positions in the east and in the south of NATO’s reach have further increased their cooperation in a variety of defence and security programmes. READ MORE.

By Fuad Shahbazov, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

As part of the 10 November ceasefire agreement that ended last year's 44-day war, a contingent of Russian soldiers was deployed to Karabakh as peacekeepers. However, the lack of a formally agreed mandate and perceptions of Russian overstepping has led to growing tensions between Baku and Moscow.
The second Karabakh war ended with the signing of a Russia-brokered ceasefire agreement and the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces with the aim of preventing further hostilities and ensuring stability in the region. However, the ceasefire arrangements between Azerbaijan–Armenia on one side and Russia–Turkey on the other has left more questions than answers. The fact that there is still no formally agreed mandate for the Russian forces operating on the ground causes outrage in Azerbaijan as local authorities loudly criticise Moscow for provocative actions. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The new war against the unrecognized Nagorno Karabakh Republic launched by Azerbaijan on September 27, 2020, has intensified discussions among the experts on the role of the external actors in the region. Significant attention was focused on the newly gained influence of Turkey as a supporter of Azerbaijan. However, as for now, the key player in the Karabakh conflict remains Russia, and most probably, this balance will not be changed at least in the short term perspective. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The July 2020 escalation along Armenia – Azerbaijan international border and following events have again put Armenia – Russia – Azerbaijan – Turkey relations in the spotlight of media and expert community. In recent years there was a wide spread perception that Azerbaijan has been making efforts to improve its relations with Russia, while Armenia – Russia relations entered an unchartered waters after the 2018 “Velvet revolution”. The large scale purchases of Russian modern weaponry by Azerbaijan were the main driver of improving bilateral relations. READ MORE

By Khayal Iskandarov Ibrahim, PhD, and Associate Professor Sadi Sadiyev Saleh, War College of the Armed Forces, Republic of Azerbaijan

In July 2020, the most recent escalation on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan brought the so-called “frozen” Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to the spotlight again. However, this time the skirmish occurred not in Nagorno-Karabakh, the occupied territory of Azerbaijan, but in another area, which is an official border far away from Nagorno-Karabakh. The first question which comes to mind is: Why Tovuz, and not Nagorno-Karabakh? READ MORE.

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On July 12, Azerbaijani forces attempted to take over an Armenian post along the Northern part of the Armenia–Azerbaijan international border. Repelled by the Armenian units, they turned to cannon shelling and the extensive use of UAVs. After two days of active clashes, the situation was calm on July 15, when new, albeit unsuccessful, attempts to seize Armenian positions were made on early morning of July 16. While five days of hostilities did not bring significant changes on the ground, it might be useful to understand the key reasons behind these recent military activities, as well as to assess possible scenarios for the future. READ MORE

By Fuad Shahbazov, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On March 1, 2020, India outperformed Russia and Poland in a US$ 40 million defense deal with Armenia to supply it with four domestically made SWATHI counter-battery radars. The system is developed by India’s Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and manufactured by Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL). It provides accurate information on enemy artillery firing positions weapons up to 75 kilometers away. The decision came amid India’s growing efforts to boost its national “Make in India” brand in the defense industry sector, which could make new inroads into European, Middle Eastern and Asian defense markets. However, the new Indian – Armenian defense deal could undermine Delhi’s relations with Russia on the one hand, and Azerbaijan, Turkey and Pakistan on the other. READ MORE

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The April 21, 2020 statements of Russian foreign Minister Lavrov brought back Nagorno Karabakh issue to the forefront of expert discussions. However, Russian foreign minister did not reveal something special or unexpected. He just reiterated what pundits following the conflict settlement process had already known. Since May 2018 negotiations have been based on a phased approach. It envisaged the return of some territories to Azerbaijan and indefinite postponement of the determination of the Nagorno Karabakh final status. READ MORE

By Eugene Kogan, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

Turkey-NATO relations have a history of challenges more or less since Turkey’s accession to NATO in 1952. Strained relations between Turkey and NATO have begun long before Turkey’s alleged failed coup attempt on 15 July 2016. However, the failed coup attempt increased tensions further and it is fair to assume that these tense relations are likely to continue. At the same time, Turkey-NATO relations are constrained by a not yet amended North Atlantic Treaty of 4 April 1949. As long as the treaty remains not updated very little can be done to change the nature of Turkey-NATO relations. READ MORE.

By Benyamin Poghosyan, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On January 28, 2020 President Trump unveiled his much long waited peace plan for the Israeli – Palestinian conflict. The plan was warmly welcomed by the Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu and Israeli opposition leader General Gantz. Simultaneously, it was sharply criticized by the Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas, who told that it belonged to the dustbin of history, and by Hamas leaders who stated that Palestinians would confront that deal. Turkish President Erdogan called it a plan to ignore the rights of Palestinians and legitimize Israel’s occupation. READ MORE