By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

As Armenia and Azerbaijan come closer to signing an agreement by the end of 2023, and competition grows between Russia and the West to lead the process and take the prize of the main pacifier, other regional actors take steps to clarify their positions. In this context, Iran stands out as one of the primary buffers against the growing role of the West in the South Caucasus.
Being engaged with the US in continuing negotiations to revive the 2015 nuclear deal in full or at least partly, Iran is simultaneously concerned by the US efforts to reduce Russian influence in the South Caucasus. This is not because Iran loves or trusts Russia but because Iran understands the dangers of being encircled by the US, including from the north. Moreover, for Iran, US influence does not mean US military bases or US direct investments. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The presidential and parliamentary elections in Turkey were perhaps the most anticipated political events of 2023. There was a feeling among politicians, experts, and academicians that the 21-year rule of Erdogan may end. Given the transition of the global order, the Russia–West confrontation, and the prominent role of Turkey in shaping the balance of power in multiple regions stretching from the Middle East to Central Asia and the Eastern Mediterranean, the foreign policy choices of Turkey are of utmost importance for all global actors.

Erdogan’s efforts to pull Turkey out from its usual role of junior partner of the US and transform the country into an independent regional player has significantly deteriorated Turkey – West relations. The US support to Kurdish forces in northeastern Syria, the purchase of Russian S-400 air defense systems, the suspicions in Turkey about potential American involvement in the July 2016 botched military coup attempt, rejection of Turkey’s request to extradite Fethullah Gülen, and Turkey’s reluctance to agree to the NATO membership of Sweden and Finland, brought US–Turkey relations to their lowest point since the end of the Cold War. Turkey’s position on the Russia – Ukraine war also did not fully satisfy the Americans. Turkey supports Ukraine economically and militarily, but Turkey rejects calls to decrease its economic relationship with Russia, while playing a crucial role simultaneously in organizing exports to Russia. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

Azerbaijan has adjusted its foreign policy agenda to target the Balkan region that is more vulnerable to the energy crisis than the states of Central and Western Europe.
Energy has long been the core element of Azerbaijan's pragmatic foreign policy, and recently it gained more impetus as European nations sought additional energy suppliers to replace Russian fossil fuel exports. Although the EU’s leading member countries are able to compensate for energy shortages by using energy reserves, employing alternative energy sources and importing additional gas volumes from alternative suppliers, the less developed Balkan states are struggling to adapt to the energy deficit. Azerbaijan has adjusted its foreign policy agenda to target the Balkan region that is more vulnerable to the energy crisis than the states of Central and Western Europe. READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

Israeli-Azerbaijani relations are based on two main pillars: patient and cordial political relations as well as defence cooperation and arms sales. While the former reached a more intensive level this year, with the opening of an Azerbaijani embassy in Tel Aviv in late March, the latter pillar of the relationship was well developed long before, as Israel became Azerbaijan’s largest weapons supplier.
After decades of keeping a low diplomatic profile vis-à-vis Israel, in November 2022 the Azerbaijani parliament approved a bill on opening an embassy in Tel Aviv. This was a historic decision as, until then, Azerbaijan had consistently rejected Israeli overtures to send a permanent ambassador, despite the opening of an Israeli embassy in Baku in August 1993. It took almost 30 years for Azerbaijan to reciprocate since the country’s leadership did not want to alienate other Muslim-majority states or provoke the Iranian authorities, who blamed Israel for worsening relations along the Baku-Tehran axis. However, in the wake of the 2020 signing of the Abraham Accords on diplomatic normalization between Israel and Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates, followed by the exchange of Israeli and Turkish ambassadors two years later, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev felt that the time was right to follow suit. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Armenians in Lebanon are a deeply institutionalized and politicized community. Given its transnational nature, the community is affected by international, regional, and local developments. For this reason, the political parties and the community leadership analyse local events and position themselves in the Lebanese political space based on local, regional, and sometimes pan-Armenian calculations or interests. Hence the community, like other transnational ethno-religious groups, absorbs from its surroundings and reacts accordingly to preserve itself from security threats. […] This policy brief will also raise a few recommendations regarding new strategies and the need to adopt a vision for the future of the community amid the wave of uncertainties surrounding Lebanon. READ MORE

By Ambassador Dilyor KHAKIMOV, Ambassador of the Republic of Uzbekistan in Belgium

Over the past year, under the leadership of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, Uzbekistan has embarked upon a national dialogue. Input, feedback, and affirmations from tens of thousands of Uzbek citizens have guided the drafting of a revised Constitution. In recent days, a flurry of activity has occurred that may soon make this draft official and usher in a fresh era for our country as we build a “New Uzbekistan.” Last week, the draft Constitution was considered in the Legislative Chamber and was approved for submission to a referendum on April 30. Then, on Monday, March 13, the Constitutional Court of Uzbekistan ruled that the decision by the Legislative Chamber to hold a referendum was in constitutional compliance. Finally, the Senate, just yesterday, March 14, confirmed this decision and approved the draft for submission to a constitutional referendum that will take place on April 30. READ MORE.

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

On February 6, 2023, two earthquakes with magnitudes 7.8 and 7.5—the deadliest in Turkey’s history—hit the Syrian-Turkish border. At least 45,000 people died in Turkey. Another 6,000 lives were lost in Syria. The fallout of the catastrophic earthquake came as President Erdogan faces his toughest re-election campaign yet. Despite speculation that Erdogan may postpone the elections, he declared that presidential and parliamentary elections will be held on the agreed-upon date, May 14 of this year.
Turkey is a central power in the Middle East. After the 2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh, its influence increased in the South Caucasus. Thus, any political shift will have an impact on the political landscape of the region. The Turkish President is known for exploiting crises; how he will be able to manage this current crisis and use it to his advantage is still questionable. This article will analyse the impact of the earthquake on Turkey’s domestic politics amid the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections as Turkey prepares to celebrate the centennial of its foundation as a republic in October 2023. READ MORE

By Nuray Alekberli, Researcher, Strategic Studies Consulting Company, Baku

In August 2022, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Georgia have signed an "Agreement amongst three countries on preliminary information exchange for the facilitation of transit customs procedures within the framework of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway project" (az.trend.az, 19 August). This agreement aimed at simplifying customs procedures and accelerating border crossing procedures within the framework of the BTK railway project through organizing an electronic exchange of initial information about goods (report.az, 18 August 2022). Therefore, somehow it plays the role of a new breath from a technical point of view to remove obstacles and speed up trade and economic relations between Asian markets and Europe. READ MORE.

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The devastating earthquakes of 7.8 and 7.5 magnitudes struck southern Turkey on February 6, 2023. As of February 12, the death toll passed 30,000, while the number of wounded reached almost 100,000. More than 12,000 buildings were destroyed, and large-scale rescue operations are underway. Besides the immense human tragedy, the earthquake will have domestic and foreign policy implications for Turkey. The country faces crucial presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for May 14. After the earthquake, discussions started about possibly postponing the elections, given the scale of destruction.
Turkey’s authorities have declared a three-month emergency in provinces affected by the earthquake. Many wonder about the possibility of pursuing an election campaign in the current circumstances. According to Turkey’s constitution, elections should occur by June 18, 2023. Only the start of a war gives authorities a legal option to postpone elections for one year. However, some experts argue that the government may apply to the Constitutional court asking for a one-year postponement claiming that the current emergency equals the launch of military activities. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Azerbaijan has closed the Lachin corridor since December 12, 2022. There are different interpretations of why Azerbaijan did it, and why Baku continues the blockade despite calls from the international community to change its course. Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia, and the West, in one way or another, all suffer from the blockade. Ultimately, it is up to the Azerbaijani leadership to decide to re-open the road.
Azerbaijan has closed the Lachin corridor since December 12, 2022. Azerbaijani official rhetoric rejects the very existence of a blockade, sometimes claiming that the road is open for humanitarian cargo, and sometimes saying that it was the Russian troops that closed the corridor. The official line from Azerbaijan is the narrative that those blocking the corridor are "independent eco-activists exercising their civil rights to protest." However, the situation is apparent to anyone with a basic understanding of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict – Azerbaijan imposed a blockade on the self-proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On November 11, a summit of the leaders of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) convened in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. This major gathering came amid the OTS’s re-emerging significance as a key regional organization and a critical platform for rapprochement between the Central Asia and Caucasus regions. The official Samarkand Declaration, which was signed as a final accord by the attendees, paves the way for a comprehensive partnership format among the OTS member states. The Samarkand meeting represented the major political gathering for the Turkic nations in 2022, and it will further facilitate dialogue and regional interconnectivity between the OTS member states—independent of Russian and Western influence. READ MORE

By Shavkat Mirziyoyev, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan’s chairmanship in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has fallen on a dynamic period, fraught with various events and trends – the period of the «historical rift», when one era comes to an end and another begins – thus far unpredictable and unknown.
The modern system of international cooperation, based on the universal principles and norms, begins to falter. One of the main reasons for this is a deep crisis of trust at the global level, which, in turn, provokes a geopolitical confrontation and the risk of reviving the bloc thinking stereotypes. This process of mutual alienation complicates the return of the world economy to its former course of development and the restoration of global supply chains. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

As the South Caucasus becomes increasingly involved in the great power competition, and the US-Russia confrontation impacts regional geopolitics, Iran looks for additional ways to secure its national interests. Iran’s top foreign policy priority remains the Middle East, where Tehran seeks to consolidate its power and influence in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. However, Iran views the South Caucasus as a significant region where Tehran should continue its presence and prevent anti-Iranian developments.
Iran is concerned with growing Azerbaijan-Israel political, economic, and military cooperation. Israel was one of the biggest weapons suppliers to Azerbaijan before, during, and after the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war. According to several sources and reports, Israel’s security services actively use Azerbaijan territory for their anti-Iranian activities. Azerbaijan established control over the 130 km long Nagorno Karabakh-Iran border due to the 2020 war and opened two airports there – Fizuli and Zangelan – located very close to the Azerbaijan-Iran border. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

During my academic visit to New Delhi in February 2020, I met with Indian politicians and scholars and discussed opportunities for upgrading Armenian-Indian relations. While back then the idea of arms trade was still immature, I raised the issue of defence cooperation between the two countries. Through honest discussions about the Armenian cause, I came to a conclusion, which I summarized in a November 2020 article for the Armenian Weekly. Despite today’s tumultuous climate in Armenia, it’s reassuring to learn that this 2020 recommendation has materialized, and bilateral ties are taking military and strategic dimensions. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The first face to face meeting between Armenian prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, and Turkish President, Recip Tayip Erdogan, took place in Prague on 6 October, on the margins of the summit of the European Political Community. Whilst in the summer there was hope of an early breakthrough in the Armenia-Turkey normalisation, decisions agreed by the special envoys of the two countries have not been implemented. May this latest meeting stimulate normalization, or further work in the process of building confidence and trust is required?
The first week of October 2022 was marked by intensive diplomacy around the geopolitics of the South Caucasus. The September 13-14, 2022, Azerbaijani aggression against Armenia threw the region back to the brink of a new large-scale war. It seemed that months-long Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiations facilitated by the European Council President Charles Michel were fruitless. However, despite bleak predictions, a new wave of diplomatic activity was launched immediately after the ceasefire was reached on September 14. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

As the world comes closer to multi-polarity, the role of such organizations as SCO will grow further. Russia and China will seek to use them as a counterbalance to western dominated international political and economic organizations, such as G7, the EU, the World Bank and IMF. In the present context of emerging great power competition, the SCO started to be viewed less as a tool to manage Russia – China relations in Central Asia, or counter terrorist threats from Afghanistan, and more as a significant grouping of non-western powers in the emerging multipolar world.
The war in Ukraine has given a new impetus to the discussions about the transformation of the global order. Experts, academicians, and politicians have been debating the potential counter-weights of the emerging post-cold war order since the global financial crisis of 2008. There were different opinions about what the new world order could be like. Among the options discussed were a new bipolar world dominated by the US-China rivalry, a multipolar world where key players – the US, China, Russia, India, EU, and perhaps others – will be in a constant fight for influence and prestige, or complete chaos with no rules and no dominant players, opening the prospect of returning humankind back to a geopolitical jungle. READ MORE

By Igor MATVEEV, PhD, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Oriental Studies, and RIAC expert, Moscow
Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Russia’s ongoing special military operation in Ukraine has sparked broad and intensive debates about future modalities of the relations between Russia and Iran in Syria. Western and Israeli analysts predict an essential growth of the political, military, and economic presence of Tehran due to Moscow’s attention switching from Syria to Ukraine. This, in turn, may shift the whole dynamics of the Russian-Iranian relations on the Syrian dossier. On the contrary, despite reports of minor pull-outs from Syria along with international media leaks about transfers of military sites to Iran and Hezbollah, Russian representatives consistently reject such forecasts, referring to a “routine rotation” but “absolutely not a withdrawal” of the Russian troops. Those speculations have intensified on the eve of the trilateral meeting of the Iranian, Russian, and Turkish leaders on Syria scheduled for July 19, 2022, in the Iranian capital. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

There should be realistic expectations of what can result from ongoing discussions on the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Turkey. Given the current situation in the South Caucasus, the region is far away from peace, and no one should have hopes that Armenia – Turkey normalization will solve conflicts and bring an era of peace to the region. However, in the current situation, even a contribution to regional stability is too significant an opportunity to miss.
The 2020 Karabakh war has significantly changed the geopolitics of the South Caucasus and triggered new processes. Turkey’s war involvement seemed to worsen further Armenia – Turkey relations. The Armenian government imposed a ban on imports from Turkey from January 2021 due to Turkey's open and evident promotion and support for the Azerbaijani war effort. However, after the early parliamentary elections in Armenia held in June 2021, Armenian officials started to speak about the necessity to normalize relations with Turkey. These discussions ended with the assignment of a special representatives to start negotiations, and the first meeting took place on January 14, 2022. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

Tensions between Turkey and Iran were recently rekindled by the latter constructing a dam over transboundary waterways, namely the Aras, Tigris, and Euphrates rivers. Iran is accusing Turkey of intentionally triggering a regional drought and water shortage –– both of which have impacted Iran brutally. Ankara says Iran’s claims are a diversion.

A new round of disagreements between Iran and Turkey began when Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian criticized Turkey’s dam projects on the Aras and Tigris rivers –– the main transboundary waterways in the region –– citing the threats to water flow in the area and environmental damage to regional states in his speech before Iran’s Parliament on May 10. Abdollahian said he has called on “his Turkish counterpart at least three times over the past months to pay serious attention to the construction of dams on the Aras River.” READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

As the “frozen conflict” with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) persists, the Ukrainian crisis poses a different challenge for Azerbaijan. “Neutrality” appears to be the watchword as Baku seeks to preserve its ties with both Moscow and Kyiv. While Baku is concerned about the developing situation, it potentially stands to benefit from the trouble with its gas exports to Europe. Given Azerbaijan’s strategic partnership with Russia after the war on Nagorno-Karabakh and its friendly relations with Ukraine (not to mention its significant gas reserves), some may think that Baku is in a prime position to benefit from the looming energy crisis presented by the region’s unrest. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

April 2022 was marked by significant developments around the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. When Russia launched a “special military operation” in Ukraine on February 24, it seemed that all other post-Soviet conflicts would enter “silent mode,” as no one would care about Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia or Transnistria. However, this was not the case, at least for Nagorno-Karabakh. On April 6, 2022, the European Union organized an Armenia–Azerbaijan summit in Brussels. President Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan agreed to form a border demarcation/delimitation commission until the end of April and take concrete steps to start peace talks. The issue of border delimitation and demarcation also was among key priorities during the November 2021 Sochi meeting facilitated by Russian President Putin. However, despite the signature of the trilateral statement, no tangible moves have been made. READ MORE

By Alan WHITEHORN, Professor Emeritus in Political Science, The Royal Military College of Canada

Coming to power after the break-up of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, Lukashenko had ruled Belarus in a highly autocratic fashion for almost three decades, while seeking to navigate his country within Moscow’s sphere of influence. However, the aging leader’s arbitrary rule began to teeter and he faced a major challenge in the election of 2020. When skewed and rigged election results were announced, hundreds of thousands of voters of Belarus peacefully protested their strong objections.
The West echoed moral support to the mass of citizens voicing democratic demands on the streets, but provided little material assistance. Somewhat optimistically and naively, the West trusted that the unarmed people would peacefully prevail over the coercive might of the internal and external dictators in Minsk and Moscow. Putin, by contrast, sensing a vulnerable and weakened regime, provided his fellow authoritarian colleague with external assistance to forcefully crush the peaceful demonstrators. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

At the recent face-to-face meetings of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in Sochi and Brussels at the end of 2021, the two leaders agreed to restore the Soviet-era Yeraskh- Julfa- Meghri- Horadiz railway connection between the two countries, which has not been in operation for three decades. However, the major expectations regarding the border delimitation/demarcation process and opening of Nakhchivan corridor remained unresolved. The last round of negotiations in Sochi was arranged in the light of deadly border skirmishes which left 13 soldiers killed on each side. While both leaders "agreed to take tangible steps for further de-escalation in the border area" the agreement on the railway connection between Baku and Yerevan was again reaffirmed during the Brussels meeting hosted by European Council President Charles Michel on December 14. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Neither Russia nor China are interested in complete decoupling from the West, and both would like to maintain cooperative relations with the EU while fighting back against US pressure. In this context a Russia – China alliance against the 'Collective West" and the establishment of a new “iron curtain” completely separating them from Europe is possibly the worst outcome for Beijing and Moscow.
The end of the "unipolar moment" and the painful process of the emergence of the new world order ushered in a stand-off between Russia and the West around the transformation of the post-cold war European security architecture. On the surface, Russia and the West are arguing about the future of the geopolitical orientation of Ukraine, but the fate of Kyiv is only the tip of the iceberg. The real fight is about the future of European security architecture in a multi-polar, more unstable, and conflict-prone global order. READ MORE

By Fuad Shahbazov, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On October 6, 2021, Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov met his Iranian counterpart Hossein Amir Abdollahian in Moscow to discuss regional security and economic cooperation, and to address important concerns regarding the crisis in the South Caucasus. During the joint press conference, Lavrov repeatedly highlighted the idea of a “3+3 cooperation format” including the three South Caucasus states – Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia – plus their three large neighbours, Russia, Turkey, and Iran, to focus on unlocking economic and transport communications in the region. The first meeting within the format took place in Moscow on December 2021; however, Georgia refused to take part. Moreover, recent tensions in the region between Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as Azerbaijan and Iran suggest that the proposed format will not generate visible positive outcomes. READ MORE