By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Over the past few weeks, security events have dramatically accelerated Israel’s aggression on Lebanon. On October 8, 2023, Hezbollah, a paramilitary political party in Lebanon (also known as the Islamic Resistance) backed by Iran, opened a front against Israel to assist Hamas in its conflict with Israel following its “al-Aqsa Storm” operation. The Lebanese front remained “managed” as Israel and Hezbollah engaged in limited clashes. This equation changed starting on September 17, 2024. Along with its fight against Hamas and the destruction of Gaza, Israel shifted its focus to Hezbollah and started bombing Lebanon, destroying the party’s infrastructure in southern Beirut, South Lebanon and Beqaa near the border with Syria. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On July 31, US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs James O’Brien reaffirmed Washington’s plans to establish a land trade route through Azerbaijan and Armenia. He stated that this route aims to offer Central Asian countries an alternative and reduce their reliance on Russia and China for access to global markets. In addition to his earlier remarks, O’Brien pointed out that part of this strategy is aimed to “create conditions” for Armenia to “distance itself from Russia”. According to him, Armenia is “almost completely dependent” on Russia for its economy and energy. Therefore, the United States supports Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s bold steps in his diversification efforts. Armenia’s re-posturing is representative of a geopolitical shift occurring throughout the wider region as the three states of the South Caucasus move further away from Russian influence. READ MORE

The Central Election Commission held a meeting and a series of events today, July 26th. The primary agenda item was the preparation and high-level accomplishment of the upcoming elections for the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis and the Councils of People's Deputies in full compliance with the Constitution and laws.
According to Article 128 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, elections for the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis and the Councils of People's Deputies are scheduled to take place on the first Sunday of the third ten-day period of October in the year their term expires. Considering that the term of the deputies of the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis and the Councils of People's Deputies ends in 2024, the elections will be held on October 27th of this year, and the election campaign will begin on July 26th, as decided by the Central Election Commission. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

After the end of the Cold War, Turkish decision-makers adopted a “top-down” strategy that capitalized on the dramatic shift in international arms production. Turkey aimed to look eastward to cooperate with China and Russia as its threat perception changed. In the second half of the 1990s, Turkey became a prominent Israeli arms purchaser. There were numerous factors behind this. First, Israeli weapons were a high-tech and credible alternative to NATO weapons. Second, unlike Europe and the U.S., Israeli arms purchases were not conditioned to Turkey’s domestic developments (democratization, human rights, minority rights…). Third, Israel and Turkey’s foreign policies overlapped in critical areas in the Middle East, aiming to contain Syrian and Iranian interests. Finally, deep relations with Israel were expected to be rewarded by pro-Israeli lobbying groups in the U.S. to counter the Armenian and Greek lobbies. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

As war in Ukraine rages and the confrontation between Russia and the West continues unabated, a growing number of experts are speaking of the beginning of Cold War 2.0, pitting the West against Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, the so-called “Axis of upheaval.” As with the original Cold War, the new one covers many areas of the globe, including Asia-Pacific, Africa, and the Middle East. The former Soviet Union remains the heart of this confrontation, and the South Caucasus is no exception. Strategically located between Russia, Turkey, and Iran, for the 25 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union the region was mainly the scene of competition between Russia and Turkey, with the first in the leading role. The last four years have brought significant changes in equilibrium. Azerbaijan transformed the status quo in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by defeating Armenia in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War with the direct military involvement of Turkey. READ MORE

By Marat Terterov, PhD, Founder, and former Executive Director of the EGF

The folly of predicting Russia’s future
When undertaking the task of seeking to forecast a ‘likely scenario’ for tomorrow’s Russia, one has to start with a caveat – predicting Russia’s future and what fate awaits the country in light of its continued military excursion in Ukraine is like trying to find a needle in a haystack. In other words, it is almost impossible to predict future political developments in Russia with any real certainty. This includes any efforts to predict whether Russia will continue to remain the arch belligerent in Ukraine, or whether it will be prepared to make concessions, or to forecast what impact either (or other) of these developments in the current conflict in Ukraine will have on the Russian regime of Vladimir Putin. READ MORE

By Fuad Shahbazov, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On January 28, 2024, masked assailants attacked a Roman Catholic church in Istanbul, killing one person. Shortly afterward, the Islamic State, through its official Amaq News Agency, claimed responsibility. Turkish police detained 47 people, most Central Asian nationals. The incident shed light on the growing presence in Turkey of a Central Asian offshoot of the Islamic State group known as ISIS-K for Khorasan, once a large portion of the Persian Empire now divided among Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asian states. The January 28 assault was the group’s first successful attack in Turkey since January 1, 2017, when jihadists invaded an Istanbul nightclub, killing 39 people and wounding nearly 80.
Since then, Turkish security forces have launched mass counter-operations against ISIS suspects in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. The operations appear to have deterred deadly terrorist attacks in large urban and border areas and to have depleted the militants’ financial resources. With the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, ISIS-K suspended overseas activities to focus more on Afghanistan and try to undermine the Taliban, which resumed control over the country after the Americans left. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

The geopolitics of the South Caucasus is as unpredictable as ever. Even as recently as the beginning of April, few, if any, would have imagined that Russia may withdraw its peacekeeping contingent from the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan anytime soon. Many observers were even sceptical about the possibility of their withdrawal in November 2025 – the date which was stipulated in the November 2020 trilateral statement as the potential but not fixed date for the ending of the peacekeeping mission of Russia. This skepticism was grounded in the understanding that for Russia, Karabakh holds paramount importance in the broader context of the South Caucasus. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Since Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s March 18 visit to Voskepar and Kiranc villages in the Tavush region, discussions and debates have been underway in Armenia on the situation along the Armenia – Azerbaijan border in that region. The visit took place after the statement of the office of Azerbaijan’s Deputy Prime Minister Shahin Mustafayev, demanding the immediate return of “four non-enclave Azerbaijani villages’” located in Tavush along the Armenia – Azerbaijan border to Azerbaijan which were in principle covered in the demarcation and delimitation negotiations. During his meetings with villagers, the Armenian prime minister stated that “the process of delimitation and demarcation between Armenia and Azerbaijan was entering the practical stage.” Despite acknowledging that there were no agreements on maps and principles of the process and that Azerbaijan would not leave the Armenian territories currently under its control, the prime minister argued for withdrawing from those villages to avoid a new war. After these meetings, some representatives of the Armenian leadership, including the speaker of the National Assembly, started to state that those territories were not part of Armenia and should be returned to Azerbaijan. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

After the military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan in September 2023 and the forced displacement of the Armenians who lived there, there were hopes in Armenia and abroad that an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement was within reach. These hopes were based on the assumption that Azerbaijan had achieved its primary objective for the past 30 years: the full absorption of Nagorno-Karabakh into Azerbaijan without any Armenian claims over the region.
Since September 2023, Azerbaijan has controlled all of Nagorno-Karabakh, with only a handful of Armenians remaining there. The Armenian government has accepted this reality and has no intention of challenging it. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan has faced no repercussions from the US, the EU, or Russia for imposing a blockade on Nagorno-Karabakh in December 2022, ignoring the orders of the International Court of Justice, launching a military attack in September 2023, or forcing all Armenians to leave the region. It seemed that the time for peace had thus arrived – a peace that would formalize Azerbaijani control over Nagorno-Karabakh, settle relations with Armenia, and open the way for the normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

2023 ended with positive notes for the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, but the new year has so far failed to maintain the momentum. Despite a successful prisoner exchange, and Armenia’s endorsement of Azerbaijan’s COP29 candidacy, recent statements from the respective governments have presented a mixed picture. While the Azerbaijani side has not indicated any setbacks in the ongoing talks yet, the Armenian government has criticized the recent statements by the Azerbaijani leader as unconstructive for the peace process.
Complicating matters further, disagreements have intensified regarding the possible regulations along the Zangezur corridor. The latest developments highlight a disparity in the visions of Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan for this corridor. Unfortunately, these developments suggest that the obstacles in the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace treaty talks may be more fundamental, potentially leading to indefinite delays in the process. READ MORE

Mahinora Mirkhamidova, associate professor of the department International law and Public law disciplines of the University of World Economy and Diplomacy

Today over two-thirds of the world's countries are participants in the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted in 1979. Ensuring women's rights is one of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals, goal 5 specifically aims at “Achieving gender equality and empowering all women and girls.” The issues of ensuring women's rights are reflected in the constitutions of almost all countries, entrenched in their legislation, and hold a significant place in national development plans and strategies. READ MORE

Qodir Djuraev, MP, Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan

The UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the resolution on "Central Asia in the face of environmental challenges: strengthening regional solidarity for the sake of sustainable development and prosperity".
The resolution initiated and proposed by Uzbekistan and unanimously adopted by the UN General Assembly highlights the pressing environmental challenges faced in Central Asia. This region, known for its diverse ecosystems and natural resources, has been grappling with various environmental issues that require immediate attention and joint collaborative efforts. The resolution serves as a significant step towards addressing these challenges and fostering sustainable development in the region. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On January 19, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan called for a new constitution in a meeting with senior officials from the Armenian Ministry of Justice. Pashinyan asserted that Armenia needs “a new constitution, not constitutional changes,” adding that the new foundational document would make the country “more competitive and viable in the new geopolitical and regional environment” (Azatutyun.am, January 19). He highlighted that the new constitution would maintain the present parliamentary system and underscored “external security” and “internationally recognized sovereign territory” as the main issues to be addressed. Mutual respect for one another’s territorial integrity remains a sticking point in peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. If Yerevan proceeds with Pashinyan’s proposal, the new constitution will eliminate certain hurdles to signing a peace treaty with Baku. READ MORE

Farangiz Avazbekova, Chief inspector of the Agency for the Development of Public Service under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan; Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Law

The social and political activity of women and their participation in public administration bodies in the process of making important decisions are crucial for the development of the country. Sociological research has shown that women’s high efficiency, rapid and persistent decision-making, responsiveness to job completion, and prompt provision of executive discipline allow them to perform their duties effectively in the civil service. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On January 8, US Senior Adviser on Caucasus Negotiations Louis Bono visited Yerevan, engaging in discussions with local officials regarding the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process. The Armenian side reported that one of the issues discussed during this visit was the organization of a meeting of the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers in Washington. Unlike his previous visits to the region, this trip omitted a visit to Baku, suggesting that it either wasn’t planned, which is unlikely, or that the Azerbaijani side was not open to receiving him. Recent developments between Baku and Yerevan, along with the evolving dynamics of mediator involvement, indicate that Azerbaijan has grown more cautious and sceptical about the role of third parties in the Armenia-Azerbaijan process. As a result, Azerbaijan has advocated for bilateral meetings between the two countries. Baku’s position is primarily related with the potential geopolitical fallout of the upcoming peace deal with Yerevan. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

In the late months of 2022 and 2023 there were intensive discussions about the possible signature of the Armenia – Azerbaijan peace agreement. Both international mediators and facilitators, as well as representatives of Armenia and Azerbaijan were making statements that a peace agreement signature is within reach. As we enter 2024, discussions are underway about the potential signature of the Armenia – Azerbaijan agreement in 2024. The December 7, 2023, bilateral statement on the release of Prisoners of War and Armenia’s support of the Azerbaijani bid to host the COP29 in Baku gave more impetus to these hopes. Some believe that the military takeover of Nagorno Karabakh by Azerbaijan in September 2023 made this perspective more realistic, especially as the Armenian government agreed not to include anything on Nagorno Karabakh in the peace agreement. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On December 13, Armenia and Azerbaijan exchanged prisoners that each side had detained at different times since the end of the Second Karabakh War in November 2020. This historic exchange was made possible thanks to a significant breakthrough between the two countries on December 7. Baku and Yerevan issued a joint statement announcing a list of confidence-building measures to normalize relations and reach a peace agreement. Azerbaijan agreed to release 32 Armenian servicemen as part of the agreement, and Armenia reciprocated by releasing two Azerbaijani soldiers. While a number of unresolved issues remain, the recent success in bilateral consultations has given new hope for a comprehensive peace agreement between the two sides. READ MORE

Taking into account the latest media reports on the new outbreak of hostilities on the Line of Contact in Karabakh (called Artsakh in Armenian) between local Armenian forces and the Azerbaijani military, I am gravely concerned about the loss of life and the indiscriminate destruction of civilian assets. As the Founder of the European Geopolitical Forum, an organisation which embraces peaceful means of conflict resolution, and which has been actively involved in finding a reasonable, sound and long-term solution to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh for some ten years, I call for an immediate end to all hostilities and a swift return of the parties to the negotiation table. I am encouraged by the breaking news of a Russian-mediated ceasefire. I call for the immediate, non-conditional resumption of the internationally mediated dialogue between Baku and representatives of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh. I also call on the Russian Federation, the United States and the European Union to actively demand peaceful settlement of the Karabakh conflict and to ensure that the ceasefire is respected without any form of deviation.

Dr Marat Terterov,
Founder, European Geopolitical Forum

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Recent geopolitical developments in the South Caucasus have once again appeared in the headlines of media and analytical centers. Experts have been questioning whether Russia is distancing itself from the region. Armenian regional experts and officials have been questioning Russia’s motives in the region, considering developments in Artsakh and the latest Azerbaijani escalation. Russia is navigating the narrow complexities of the post-2020 Artsakh War regional architecture, asserting itself as the main power broker in the region (i.e. brokering the 2020 trilateral ceasefire agreement, arranging humanitarian aid to Artsakh via the Berdzor Corridor and Aghdam, and possibly a new deal in the coming days) through compromise or political flexibility. This flexibility has caused friction in Moscow-Yerevan relations.
Many in Russia, including high officials, are suspicious of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s motives towards their country. The Armenian leader has speculated that Russia seems to be leaving the region. However, Russia still views the region as “blizhnee zarubezhe” (its “near abroad”) or its “lebensraum” (its “vital space”). From Russia’s perspective, if it leaves the South Caucasus, its only route to the Middle East would be cut off, Iran and Turkey would clash for power, and the North Caucasus would become vulnerable to instability. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On September 19, the Azerbaijani Defence Ministry announced it had launched an “anti-terrorist” operation against “illegal formations” in Karabakh. This move came after four Azerbaijani soldiers and two civilians were killed by land mines in the region. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan condemned the “full-scale aggression” and denounced Russian peacekeepers for “failing to do their jobs’.
The recent fighting comes as tensions had been mounting over Baku’s efforts to fully integrate Karabakh back into Azerbaijan. This measure had been stipulated in the tripartite agreement signed by Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia following the end of the Second Karabakh War in November 2020. Russian peacekeepers were stationed in the region to facilitate implementation of the measure; yet, they have done little since to constructively manage the process. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On September 9, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan spoke on the phone with the leaders of France, Iran, Georgia and Germany, as well as US Secretary of State Antony Blinken. In a manner that resembled his outreach to various world leaders at the beginning of the Second Karabakh War (September 7–November 10, 2020), the Armenian premier warned against intensifying tensions in the region and stated his readiness for immediate talks with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev without preconditions. Pashinyan’s words came on the heels of several setbacks that threaten to derail Armenian-Azerbaijani peace negotiations and may lead to another military conflict.
Both sides accuse each other of a military build-up along their shared border in preparation for an offensive. According to the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry, a military threat also emanates from the continued presence of Armenian troops in Karabakh, despite Yerevan’s earlier pledge to withdraw them by September 2022. READ MORE

By Nika CHITADZE, PhD, Director of the Center for International Studies, Tbilisi

One of the most important consequences of the Russia-Ukraine war is probably the fact that Russia is losing its geopolitical influence in the post-Soviet space, which Russia officially called the "near abroad", that is, the sphere of its geopolitical influence. In this direction, it should be noted that the role of Russia as a "mediator" and "peacemaker" in the field of various conflict resolution is weakening. An example of this is that Russia's role in mediating between Armenia and Azerbaijan is weakening, and therefore in solving the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. It is well known that in November 2020, it was Russia that presented us as the main "guarantor" for the settlement of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan around Nagorno-Karabakh, when it seemed that Russia stopped hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh and deployed its own "peacekeeping forces". READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

As the sides are coming closer to the signature of a peace agreement, steps should be taken to solve the issues along the Armenia – Azerbaijan state border and the line of contact. The population of the self–proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Armenians and Azerbaijanis living along the state border have the inalienable right to live in a secure environment while external actors are moving forward with their geopolitical ambitions. In this context, a concrete measure to ease tensions can be the establishment of an incident prevention and response mechanism.

The restart of intensive Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiations in May 2023 gave hope that an Armenia – Azerbaijan peace agreement is within reach. Meetings in Washington, Brussels, Moscow, and Chisinau seem to have paved the way for a deal by the end of 2023. Officials from both countries started to sound more optimistic regarding the prospects of peace and stability in the South Caucasus. The Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers will have another round of talks in Washington in the next days, and the President of the European Council Michel will host Prime Minister Pashinyan and President Aliyev in Brussels on 21 July. READ MORE

By Nika CHITADZE, PhD, Director of the Center for International Studies, Tbilisi

As it is known, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Moscow and Minsk agreed to deploy tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus. The construction of a special warehouse is already underway and will be completed by July 1 of this year. Therefore, it can be said that Putin's blackmailing strategy has entered the next acute phase, and it is theoretically possible that such steps will sooner or later push the world toward a nuclear confrontation. It should be noted that after the dissemination of information about the placement of nuclear weapons in Belarus, the US Department of Defence issued an emergency statement. It says that "the Pentagon sees no indication that Russia is preparing to use nuclear weapons." On the other hand, as Vladimir Putin told the Russian government media, ten Su-25 aircraft capable of carrying tactical nuclear weapons are already stationed on the territory of Belarus. In addition, according to him, Russia has given Belarus the "Iskander" missile system, which can also launch missiles equipped with a nuclear warhead. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

May 2023 will be remembered as the month of intensive negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It started from the four-day summit in Washington, where the two ministers of foreign affairs with their teams were engaged in face-to-face interactions to discuss the text of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement. Ten days later, Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders met in Brussels, revitalizing the Brussels format, which had been stalled in September 2022. As a result of the Brussels summit, the sides reiterated the mutual recognition of territorial integrity based on the Alma-Ata declaration. For the first time, they agreed to use exact numbers when describing each other’s territories. This step dispersed fears in Azerbaijan that despite signing the Prague statement in October 2022 and recognizing Azerbaijani territorial integrity based on the Alma-Ata declaration, Armenia may still avoid recognizing Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh) as part of Azerbaijan, arguing that Artsakh was not part of Azerbaijan on December 21, 1991, when the Alma-Ata declaration was signed. A few days later, the Armenian Prime Minister confirmed that Armenia recognizes Artsakh as part of Azerbaijan during his speech at the summit of the Council of Europe. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

After a break of several months Armenia and Azerbaijan have now resumed their engagement in peace negotiations in earnest. After a face-to-face meeting between leaders in Munich in February, the Armenian and Azerbaijani ministers of foreign affairs went to Washington in early May 2023 to take part in the most intensive round of negotiations ever held since the Spring 2001 Key West summit between Presidents Heydar Aliyev and Robert Kocharyan. The ministers achieved progress, opening the path for the 14 May Brussels summit involving Prime Minister Pashinyan, President Aliyev, and President of the European Union Council Charles Michel. On 19 May, the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers met in Moscow, and a trilateral Aliyev - Pashinyan - Putin summit was scheduled for 25 May. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On March 30, Azerbaijan officially inaugurated its first embassy in Tel Aviv, Israel, after avoiding the move for three decades. Although the decision highlighted the importance of Azerbaijani-Israeli relations, it quickly became a catalyst behind the renewed war of words between Iran and Azerbaijan. Since 2021, diplomatic relations between Tehran and Baku have steadily become embittered. Iran is primarily concerned with the decline of its influence in the South Caucasus, which has suffered since the end of the Second Karabakh War in 2020. As such, in an attempt by Tehran to flex its muscles and intimidate Azerbaijan, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps conducted large-scale military drills on the border with Azerbaijan in October 2022. Unlike previous years, the exercises provoked an uneasy reaction within Azerbaijan and triggered anti-Iranian sentiments throughout the country. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

As Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiations entered a more active phase after a months-long limbo with marathon discussions in Washington, an upcoming trilateral meeting at the level of foreign ministers in Moscow, and a possible Pashinyan – Aliyev summit in Chisinau on 1 June 2023, the key contested issue remains Armenia's demand for a long-term international presence in Nagorno Karabakh and the establishment of an international mechanism for Azerbaijan – Nagorno Karabakh negotiations.
In his 5 May 2023, interview with Radio Liberty, Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan stated that the rights and security of Nagorno Karabakh Armenians remained the main issue, where the sides still had divergent views. The concept of "rights and security of Nagorno Karabakh Armenians" came into centre stage in early 2022, as the Armenian government dropped its demand for autonomy for Nagorno Karabakh within Azerbaijan. Since Spring 2022, Armenia has avoided the terms of status and self-determination in its rhetoric on Nagorno Karabakh, instead emphasizing the necessity to protect rights and provide security for Nagorno Karabakh Armenians. READ MORE