By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

Over the past two years, since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Azerbaijan’s foreign and security policies have drawn varying interpretations from experts and political observers. The delicate balancing act pursued by Baku between competing global powers while safeguarding the country’s national interests and restoring its territorial integrity has appeared as an intriguing case for the studies of international relations. Amidst the evolving dynamics of regional geopolitics, Azerbaijan’s recent engagements with Western counterparts underscore its unwavering commitment to maintaining robust relations with the West. Despite the complexities of navigating relations with neighbouring powers, Azerbaijan remains steadfast in its pursuit of multilateral or, as better known in the Azerbaijani discourse, balanced approach in foreign policy.
Many experts are still debating how the Azerbaijani government succeeded to dismantle the separatist regime in Karabakh without provoking a clash with Russia, widely known to be the major protector of this regime. In November 2023, during an international conference in a European city attended by the author of this article, Armenian experts critiqued the collaboration between Azerbaijan and the Western powers (i.e., the EU and United States) in September 2023 to dismantle to the separatist regime, aiming to diminish Russia's influence in the South Caucasus. Interestingly, some of these experts now suggest that Baku has aligned with Moscow to penalize Armenia’s pro-Western government. This situation underscores the complexity of Azerbaijan's foreign policy, often susceptible to misinterpretation. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Since 2020, the South Caucasus has entered an active era of turbulence. The primary reason was the Azerbaijani decision to use military force to “solve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.” Azerbaijan started the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, launched incursions into Armenia proper in May, November 2021, and September 2022, and imposed a blockade on Nagorno-Karabakh in December 2022. The culmination of this strategy was the September 2023 military attack against Nagorno-Karabakh, which resulted in the forced displacement of around 105,000 Armenians and the dissolution of the self-proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic.
Even after the complete takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan continues its policy of threats and pressure towards Armenia with an ever-changing shopping list of demands. Baku supports the concept of so-called “Western Azerbaijan” at the highest level. It expects an extraterritorial corridor from Armenia. It states that it will not pull away its troops from occupied Armenian territories, rejects Armenia’s offer to sign a non-aggression pact and continues to demand changes in the Armenian constitution and other laws. READ MORE

Obid Khakimov, director of the Center for Economic Research and Reforms under the Administration of the Republic of Uzbekistan

The dynamic growth of the population of Uzbekistan requires at least high outstripping economic growth rates in order to adequately meet the growing needs and improve the standard of living of people. But this requires new, more balanced and verified approaches to ensure timely achievement of the set goals.
And these new approaches to economic policy were clearly manifested in the decisions taken at the important meetings held at the beginning of the year under the chairmanship of the President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev on the situation in the economy and the tasks assigned to the economic divisions for 2024. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

From November 27-29, 2023, a delegation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission visited Yerevan. The EU Delegation to Armenia said the purpose of the trip was to “explore possibilities to deepen and strengthen EU-Armenia relations.” Ideas were exchanged on “how to best leverage investments to address the immediate needs and enable integration of displaced Karabakh Armenians.” They agreed to “explore areas to strengthen cooperation between the EU’s Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) and Armenia” and continue dialogue on matters of security and defence, such as the EU’s promise to explore non-lethal support to the Armenian military via the European Peace Facility. The EU representatives announced their support for the “normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan based on the principles of mutual recognition of territorial integrity and inviolability of borders based on the 1991 Almaty Declaration. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

In recent years, perhaps the most discussed topic by international scholars, experts and politicians is the gradual transformation of the post-Cold War unipolar world order. There are different opinions about the process of transformation, the timing, and the main elements of this newly emerging world order. However, almost everyone agrees on one issue: the unipolar world is gradually becoming history, and before the final formation of the new world order, the next decade will be characterized by instability, conflicts, and economic shocks. Climate change and the ever-increasing role of digital technologies, including artificial intelligence, are additional factors of instability that make it even more difficult to assess, predict and formulate policies based on geopolitical developments in the coming years. READ MORE

By Nika CHITADZE, PhD, Director of the Center for International Studies, Tbilisi

BRICS is an acronym for the top five emerging (except Russia) economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. The first four were originally grouped as “BRIC” (or “BRIC”) in 2001, and South Africa joined in 2010. BRICS was created to draw attention to investment opportunities and was not an official intergovernmental organization. Since 2009, they have increasingly evolved into a more cohesive geopolitical bloc, with governments meeting annually at official summits and coordinating multilateral policies. On July 24, 2022, China hosted the 14th BRICS summit and in August 2023, the summit was held in South Africa.
BRICS is considered the main rival of the G7 bloc of advanced economies, having announced competing initiatives such as the New Development Bank, the Contingent Reserve Facility, the BRICS payment system, and the BRICS reserve currency. Since 2022, the group has been looking to expand membership and several developing countries have expressed interest in joining. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The war in Ukraine has significantly impacted the geopolitics of the former Soviet space. As Russia – West relations have hit the lowest point since the end of the Cold War, or perhaps even since the Caribbean nuclear crisis of 1962, the newly independent states face tough choices in their foreign policy. Can they find a balance between Russia and the West, and if not, should they choose Russia or the West? It seemed that this conundrum should not apply to Armenia. The country is a member of all Russian-led organizations in the post-Soviet space – Collective Security Treaty Organization, Eurasian Economic Union, and Armenia hosts a Russian military base and Russian border troops. Thus, many may argue that Armenia has already chosen to be with Russia, and the war in Ukraine would complicate Armenian efforts to develop relations with the West, which Yerevan has done quite successfully in the last three decades. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On November 16, Baku cancelled a meeting between the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan scheduled to take place on November 20 in Washington. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry asserted that, under the current circumstances, it is not possible to proceed with US-mediated peace negotiations. The statement alluded to US Assistant Secretary of State James O’Brien’s comments during “The Future of Nagorno-Karabakh” hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe on November 15. The hearing highlighted a growing break between Baku and Washington on how to proceed with the peace talks. Azerbaijan has called for “more regional solutions to regional problems,” while the United States and European Union hope to maintain influence over negotiations between Baku and Yerevan. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On 15 November, during a hearing before the United States Congressional Committee on Foreign Affairs regarding the future of Karabakh, James O’Brien, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, made a statement that stirred significant concern in Azerbaijan. While addressing the Armenia-Azerbaijan disputes and developments in the South Caucasus, he asserted, “A future that is built around the access of Russia and Iran as the main participants in the security of the region, the South Caucasus, is unstable and undesirable including both for the governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia. They have the opportunity to make a different decision now”. This statement comes in the wake of a series of developments indicating a shift towards a new security order in the South Caucasus. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

EU-Azerbaijan relations are important for both sides, and the Brussels format of the Armenia-Azerbaijani peace talks, are likewise important to reach negotiated solutions over the remaining unresolved questions between Baku and Yerevan. The reactivation of the Brussels format and the revitalization of the constructive role of the EU in the South Caucasus should happen sooner rather than later. A balanced approach by the EU and its leading member states vis-à-vis the countries of the region is of utmost necessity towards this end.
On 25 October, Toivo Klaar, the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus, announced that the scheduled meeting between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev with the mediation of the European Council President Charles Michel in Brussels [known as the Brussels format of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace talks] had been postponed due to scheduling problems. Previously, another EU-brokered summit between these two leaders from the South Caucasus, originally planned to take place on the sidelines of the European Political Community gathering on 5 October, was cancelled by the Azerbaijani side. READ MORE

Umidjon Qodirov, Independent researcher of the Academy of the MIA of the Republic of Uzbekistan, cand.of law sciences, associate professor

Special attention is being paid to ensuring a peaceful and tranquil life of the population and to forming a culture of law-abidingness and public safety as part of the large-scale reforms implemented in our country. In particular, completely new mechanisms and procedures for organizing work in the direction of public safety on the basis of the principle of “Serving the interests of the people” are introduced, and mutual purposeful cooperation of state bodies with public structures is established. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On October 4, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev cancelled a meeting with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, European Council President Charles Michel, French President Emmanuel Macron, and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz that was meant to take place at the European Political Community summit in Granada, Spain, on October 5. The Granada summit was a long-awaited occasion in the context of the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace talks, particularly against the backdrop of the collapse of the separatist regime in Azerbaijan’s Karabakh region. Baku has instead voiced its support for more regionally centric negotiating formats for solving disputes in the South Caucasus. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

On September 28, 2023, Artsakh President Samvel Shahramanyan issued a decree announcing that, in the wake of Azerbaijan’s assault on Artsakh, the authorities of Artsakh agreed to dissolve their government by the end of the year and be fully integrated into Azerbaijan.
The decree aimed: to dissolve all state institutions and organizations under their departmental subordination until January 1, 2024, and the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) shall cease to exist; the population of Nagorno-Karabakh, including those outside the Republic, after the entry into force of this decree, shall familiarize themselves with the conditions of reintegration presented by the Republic of Azerbaijan in order to make an independent and individual decision on the possibility of staying in Nagorno-Karabakh.
This was perceived as the end of the Artsakh dream. However, this announcement came under the threat of force and ethnic cleansing, placing its legality in question. Moreover, most of the political and military leaders of Artsakh have been arrested by Azerbaijan, amid the passive stance of the Russian peacekeepers and the Armenian government. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On September 19, 2023, Azerbaijan launched a military offensive against the self-declared Nagorno Karabakh Republic with one clear goal – to destroy it. It was a logical continuation of Azerbaijan’s decades-long policy, including the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war and the blockade of the Lachin (Berdzor) corridor imposed in December 2022. After 24 hours of intensive fighting, the self-declared Nagorno Karabakh Republic surrendered. A few days later, the large exodus of the Armenian population started, and by the end of September 2023, less than 100 Armenians were left in Nagorno Karabakh. On September 28, the president of the self-declared Nagorno Karabakh Republic signed a decree to dissolve the Republic by the end of 2023.
The reaction in Armenia to these events was somewhat surprising. The government made it clear that Armenia would not intervene to prevent the destruction of Nagorno Karabakh. Most Armenians went to social media, lamenting the lack of actions by Russia, the EU, and the US. Many were genuinely surprised that for Russia and the collective West, geopolitical or economic interests had more value than the fate of 100,000 Armenians who lived in Nagorno Karabakh for the last several millennia. READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

In a nutshell, friendly relations between Georgia and Turkey are not a deterrent against potential Russian aggression against Georgia. Russia can always impose a blockade of Georgia’s Black Sea coast by using its naval assets in Sevastopol, Crimea and Ochamchire in occupied Abkhazia, thereby effectively ‘strangling’ the nascent Georgian Coast Guard. However, despite being somewhat politically marginalised by the West, Turkey remains a crucial partner for Georgia.
Georgian–Turkish relations are in essence cordial but not equal. Georgia’s Prime Minister, Irakli Garibashvili, is viewed as a junior partner in the relationship with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. For Georgia, Turkey represents an important partner in the volatile South Caucasus region. At the same time, enjoying friendly relations with Georgia as a transit country for oil, gas and cargo trains from Azerbaijan to Turkey, known as the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway, is important for Turkey. Moreover, cargo transferred by road from Russia and Azerbaijan via Georgia to Turkey is a basic necessity. Bilateral relations are mainly focused on the economy and, occasionally, the Turkish military donates or sells military equipment to the Georgian Defence Forces (GDF). READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The lightning offensive of Azerbaijan against the self-declared Nagorno Karabakh Republic launched on September 19 has significantly changed the regional security architecture, which emerged after the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war. Within 24 hours, Azerbaijan forced the unrecognized Republic to surrender, followed by the forced displacement of the entire Armenian population. As of early October 2023, around 102000 Armenians entered Armenia from Nagorno Karabakh, while, according to various estimates, from 15 to several hundred Armenians remained in the area. This new status quo raises many questions regarding the future of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in the area, the prospects of the Armenia – Azerbaijan peace treaty, and the fate of Armenians from Karabakh, including such issues as the right of return and property compensation READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

On July 9, Turkey freed the commanders of the well-known Ukrainian Azov regiment after months of hosting them as a part of a deal with Russia. The fighters surrendered to Russian forces after weeks of brutal siege and resistance at the Azovstal Iron and Steel Works in Mariupol, even after the rest of the city had fallen following Russia’s devastating and relentless assaults. Ankara’s surprise move came during Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s first official visit to Turkey since the Russian invasion in February 2022 to meet his counterpart, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and discuss the possibilities of deepening their strategic partnership. Amid rhetoric on expanding the two countries’ cooperation in defense and security, Erdogan also declared, “Ukraine deserves to be a NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] member”. READ MORE

By Vusal GULIYEV, Visiting Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Center of Boğaziçi University

In late December 2022, Türkiye’s Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, raised the Uyghur issue at an end-of-the-year press briefing by questioning whether Xi Jinping’s government had failed to keep a promise made five years ago. The Uyghur issue concerns events that began in 2017, in which the accusations against the Chinese government’s crackdown on thousands of Uyghurs in detention camps under the guise of an anti-terrorist operation has started. The promise of which Çavuşoğlu spoke was an unfettered visit by a Turkish to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). However, that promise has not been kept because of the myriad of requirements placed on the visit by China, such as predetermining the places to be visited. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

The post-November 10, 2020 geopolitical reality in the South Caucasus and the shift of balance of power have created not just an unfavourable situation for Armenia, but for Iran as well, which felt isolated from the region. Despite Tehran’s pro-active engagement towards the region, Iranian experts and politicians felt their legitimate concerns were being unheard in Moscow. Many even publicly criticized the Russian leadership for working against Iranian interests in the region by cooperating closely with Turkey.
On what issues have Russia and Iran diverged in the region?
Iranian expert on the South Caucasus Vali Kaleji, in his article “Russia and Iran Diverge in the South Caucasus,” argued that despite the similarities in Iran’s and Russia’s approaches towards the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus, after November 10, 2020, the countries have diverged when it comes to the “Zangezur Corridor,” its impact on the Armenian-Iranian border and Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan. Moreover, after the war in Ukraine, Russia distanced itself from the developments in the region leaving Armenia alone in resisting the Turkish-Azerbaijani-Israeli axis. This factor has created a security and strategic dilemma for Iran along its entire northwestern border. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

Azerbaijan has adjusted its foreign policy agenda to target the Balkan region that is more vulnerable to the energy crisis than the states of Central and Western Europe.
Energy has long been the core element of Azerbaijan's pragmatic foreign policy, and recently it gained more impetus as European nations sought additional energy suppliers to replace Russian fossil fuel exports. Although the EU’s leading member countries are able to compensate for energy shortages by using energy reserves, employing alternative energy sources and importing additional gas volumes from alternative suppliers, the less developed Balkan states are struggling to adapt to the energy deficit. Azerbaijan has adjusted its foreign policy agenda to target the Balkan region that is more vulnerable to the energy crisis than the states of Central and Western Europe. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The 2007-2008 world financial crisis triggered discussions about the inevitable decline of the post-Cold War unipolar order, marked by absolute US hegemony. The Arab Spring, the 2014 Ukraine crisis, the Syrian civil war, and the botched US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 contributed to the ongoing debate about the relative decline of the US and the rise of other powers. The growing influence of non-Western institutions, such as the association of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), attempts to abandon the US dollar in bilateral trade, and the establishment of alternative international financial institutions, such as the New Development Bank of BRICS and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, seemed to shatter the undisputed leadership of Western political and financial institutions and the role of the US dollar as the only global reserve currency. The growing economic and military strength of China, the more assertive foreign policy of Russia, and India’s balanced foreign policy seeking to pursue cooperative relations with the West and Russia were signs of the changing nature of international relations. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

On a diplomatic level, Turkey tried to launch “Astana style” diplomatic measures to address Nagorno-Karabakh. However, given the fact that the conflict was taking place in the post-Soviet space, Russia failed to see much incentive in engaging in a bilateral track with Turkey in the form of a new “Astana style” process where Turkey and Russia were going to be equal partners, addressing a conflict in Russia’s “backyard”.
The year 2022 witnessed intensified dialogues between top Syrian and Turkish officials. These kicked off with an August meeting in Damascus between Ali Mamlouk, the Head of the National Security Bureau of the Ba’ath Party and a Special Security Advisor to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and Hakan Fidan, the Head of Turkiye’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT). They concluded with a tripartite December meeting in Moscow, where Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu hosted his Syrian and Turkish colleagues Ali Mahmoud Abbas and Hulusi Akar (remarkably, Ali Mamlouk and Hakan Fidan were also present). Those meetings prompted world media and political experts to speculate about an “unthinkable” Syrian-Turkish rapprochement becoming “thinkable”. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

For the last weeks Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations on a peaceful normalisation of relations appeared stalled. The stand-off with Azerbaijani activists on the Lachin Corridor continues to hinder progress. The US initiative to organize a Pashinyan – Aliyev meeting at the latest Munich Security Conference was "a step in the right direction". It gave a new breath of life to the negotiation process, and efforts are underway to revive the Brussels format and organize the fifth Pashinyan – Aliyev meeting in Brussels with the participation of the President of the European Council, Charles Michel.
After the brief momentum in Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiations in late September - early October 2022, the peace process seemed to stall. Assessing what went wrong after the 6 October 2022 Prague meeting is challenging. However, the Sochi summit held on 31 October and the meeting between foreign ministers held in Washington on 7 November did not add optimism to the future of the negotiation process. […]
Nevertheless, Armenia and Azerbaijan continued to work on the draft of the peace treaty, exchanging suggestions and ideas, and Yerevan sent its version of the final document to Azerbaijan and the OSCE Minsk Group co-chair states in mid-February. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

On December 12, under the pretext of environmentalism, dozens of Azerbaijani state-backed “eco-activists” blocked the only land corridor in the Stepanakert-Shushi section connecting Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh. As anticipated, the “environmental” slogans were soon politicized, and political demands were raised by enforcing a blockade. A humanitarian disaster was created for the 120,000 Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh. The real question is why Azerbaijan went for such a provocation and at what risk? Hence, in this article, I will shed light on the current crisis based on my meetings with Azerbaijani experts (keeping their identities anonymous) on the sidelines of several international conferences and online interviews I have conducted to analyze the Azerbaijani perspective and highlight the threats, arguing that the current humanitarian crisis is much deeper than the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, and it is related with the “battle of corridors” and beyond. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The defeat in the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war shocked Armenia and Armenians all around the world. It ruined many perceptions deeply entrenched in political elites, expert and academic communities, and broader society: including that the Armenian army was the strongest in the South Caucasus, that Russia would not allow Turkey's involvement in Azerbaijan's war against Armenia, and that the West would not allow authoritarian Azerbaijan and Turkey to attack democratic Armenia. All these assumptions were crushed within 44 days, leaving Armenia facing a much harsher geopolitical reality. Despite this terrible outcome, many in Armenia believed that the November 10, 2020, trilateral statement would foment a new status quo. READ MORE