By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On 15 November, during a hearing before the United States Congressional Committee on Foreign Affairs regarding the future of Karabakh, James O’Brien, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, made a statement that stirred significant concern in Azerbaijan. While addressing the Armenia-Azerbaijan disputes and developments in the South Caucasus, he asserted, “A future that is built around the access of Russia and Iran as the main participants in the security of the region, the South Caucasus, is unstable and undesirable including both for the governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia. They have the opportunity to make a different decision now”. This statement comes in the wake of a series of developments indicating a shift towards a new security order in the South Caucasus. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

It may appear that the primary obstacle to the signature of a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan is the different views of the sides on where to resume and finalize the process. Armenia wants to do that in Western platforms, while Azerbaijan wants to return to the Russian platform, use the 3+2 format, or have direct negotiations without any mediators. In reality, the roots of the current situation are more profound than simple geopolitical choices of venue.”
The military takeover of the self–proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic by Azerbaijan has raised hopes that it may facilitate the signature of the peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The logic behind this thinking was clear – the future of Nagorno Karabakh, and the fate of the Armenians living were the primary obstacles on the road toward peace. As all Armenians were forced to leave the region, and NKR de facto president Samvel Shahramanyan signed a decree about the dissolution of the republic by the end of 2023, it seemed that the stage was set for quick signature of the Armenia – Azerbaijan peace treaty, and then a push forward in the Armenia – Turkey normalization process. READ MORE

By Vasif HUSEYNOV, PhD, Head of Department, AIR Center, Adjunct Lecturer, ADA and Khazar Universities, Baku

On October 4, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev cancelled a meeting with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, European Council President Charles Michel, French President Emmanuel Macron, and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz that was meant to take place at the European Political Community summit in Granada, Spain, on October 5. The Granada summit was a long-awaited occasion in the context of the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace talks, particularly against the backdrop of the collapse of the separatist regime in Azerbaijan’s Karabakh region. Baku has instead voiced its support for more regionally centric negotiating formats for solving disputes in the South Caucasus. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

On September 28, 2023, Artsakh President Samvel Shahramanyan issued a decree announcing that, in the wake of Azerbaijan’s assault on Artsakh, the authorities of Artsakh agreed to dissolve their government by the end of the year and be fully integrated into Azerbaijan.
The decree aimed: to dissolve all state institutions and organizations under their departmental subordination until January 1, 2024, and the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) shall cease to exist; the population of Nagorno-Karabakh, including those outside the Republic, after the entry into force of this decree, shall familiarize themselves with the conditions of reintegration presented by the Republic of Azerbaijan in order to make an independent and individual decision on the possibility of staying in Nagorno-Karabakh.
This was perceived as the end of the Artsakh dream. However, this announcement came under the threat of force and ethnic cleansing, placing its legality in question. Moreover, most of the political and military leaders of Artsakh have been arrested by Azerbaijan, amid the passive stance of the Russian peacekeepers and the Armenian government. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Since the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war, diversification has probably been the most-used term in discussions about the future of Armenian foreign policy. It should be noted that Armenia has sought to pursue a diversified foreign policy since the early years of independence. In parallel with establishing a strategic alliance with Russia, Armenia has launched a pragmatic partnership with the EU and NATO. Armenia signed its first IPAP (Individual Partnership Action Plan) with NATO in 2005. NATO was actively involved in the defence reforms in Armenia accelerated after 2008, including defence education and strategic defence review. Armenia joined the EU Eastern partnership initiative in 2009. It failed to conclude the Association Agreement with Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. Instead, it signed the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement in 2017, now serving as the solid base for Armenia–EU relations. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

On September 19, 2023, Azerbaijan launched a military offensive against the self-declared Nagorno Karabakh Republic with one clear goal – to destroy it. It was a logical continuation of Azerbaijan’s decades-long policy, including the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war and the blockade of the Lachin (Berdzor) corridor imposed in December 2022. After 24 hours of intensive fighting, the self-declared Nagorno Karabakh Republic surrendered. A few days later, the large exodus of the Armenian population started, and by the end of September 2023, less than 100 Armenians were left in Nagorno Karabakh. On September 28, the president of the self-declared Nagorno Karabakh Republic signed a decree to dissolve the Republic by the end of 2023.
The reaction in Armenia to these events was somewhat surprising. The government made it clear that Armenia would not intervene to prevent the destruction of Nagorno Karabakh. Most Armenians went to social media, lamenting the lack of actions by Russia, the EU, and the US. Many were genuinely surprised that for Russia and the collective West, geopolitical or economic interests had more value than the fate of 100,000 Armenians who lived in Nagorno Karabakh for the last several millennia. READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

In a nutshell, friendly relations between Georgia and Turkey are not a deterrent against potential Russian aggression against Georgia. Russia can always impose a blockade of Georgia’s Black Sea coast by using its naval assets in Sevastopol, Crimea and Ochamchire in occupied Abkhazia, thereby effectively ‘strangling’ the nascent Georgian Coast Guard. However, despite being somewhat politically marginalised by the West, Turkey remains a crucial partner for Georgia.
Georgian–Turkish relations are in essence cordial but not equal. Georgia’s Prime Minister, Irakli Garibashvili, is viewed as a junior partner in the relationship with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. For Georgia, Turkey represents an important partner in the volatile South Caucasus region. At the same time, enjoying friendly relations with Georgia as a transit country for oil, gas and cargo trains from Azerbaijan to Turkey, known as the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway, is important for Turkey. Moreover, cargo transferred by road from Russia and Azerbaijan via Georgia to Turkey is a basic necessity. Bilateral relations are mainly focused on the economy and, occasionally, the Turkish military donates or sells military equipment to the Georgian Defence Forces (GDF). READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The lightning offensive of Azerbaijan against the self-declared Nagorno Karabakh Republic launched on September 19 has significantly changed the regional security architecture, which emerged after the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war. Within 24 hours, Azerbaijan forced the unrecognized Republic to surrender, followed by the forced displacement of the entire Armenian population. As of early October 2023, around 102000 Armenians entered Armenia from Nagorno Karabakh, while, according to various estimates, from 15 to several hundred Armenians remained in the area. This new status quo raises many questions regarding the future of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in the area, the prospects of the Armenia – Azerbaijan peace treaty, and the fate of Armenians from Karabakh, including such issues as the right of return and property compensation READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

Since the inauguration of President Biden in January 2021, the US administration has kept its relationship with Turkey to a bare minimum. For the Biden administration, the issue of human rights in Turkey remains very much on the agenda while for President Erdoğan, the issue seems to be a lower priority for his administration. Such behaviour infuriates not just Biden administration officials but also members of the House and the Senate. This has resulted in the Turkish president not being invited to Washington. Perhaps the two sides can each be blamed for their current relationship; however, Erdoğan is maintaining his course and appears unbothered by the consequences. For his part, Biden is keeping his cool despite a number of divergences in interests of the US and Turkey. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Azerbaijan's destruction by force of the self-declared Nagorno Karabakh Republic (NKR) is seen by some as removing one of the key obstacles in the negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, that will resume in the next days in Granada, Spain. Others however see the elimination of the Karabakh factor as opening the way for Azerbaijan to make even more demands on Armenia. It is challenging to assess whether peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan is within reach. However, one thing is clear: the second humiliation of Armenia within three years has already triggered significant backlash among Armenians. Many are still in shock, which is why Yerevan witnessed only small protests recently. However, many Armenians are fed up with permanent losses, and there is a growing feeling that Armenia, in the long–term perspective, should become stronger to reclaim its position in the region. In the current environment, any attack of Azerbaijan against Armenia, regardless of pretexts or reasons, will only strengthen this feeling among Armenians and will be a direct path to long-term instability and conflicts in the South Caucasus. READ MORE

By Nika CHITADZE, PhD, Director of the Center for International Studies, Tbilisi

BRICS is an acronym for the top five emerging (except Russia) economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. The first four were originally grouped as “BRIC” (or “BRIC”) in 2001, and South Africa joined in 2010. BRICS was created to draw attention to investment opportunities and was not an official intergovernmental organization. Since 2009, they have increasingly evolved into a more cohesive geopolitical bloc, with governments meeting annually at official summits and coordinating multilateral policies. On July 24, 2022, China hosted the 14th BRICS summit and in August 2023, the summit was held in South Africa.
BRICS is considered the main rival of the G7 bloc of advanced economies, having announced competing initiatives such as the New Development Bank, the Contingent Reserve Facility, the BRICS payment system, and the BRICS reserve currency. Since 2022, the group has been looking to expand membership and several developing countries have expressed interest in joining. READ MORE

By Vusal GULIYEV, Visiting Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Center of Boğaziçi University

In late December 2022, Türkiye’s Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, raised the Uyghur issue at an end-of-the-year press briefing by questioning whether Xi Jinping’s government had failed to keep a promise made five years ago. The Uyghur issue concerns events that began in 2017, in which the accusations against the Chinese government’s crackdown on thousands of Uyghurs in detention camps under the guise of an anti-terrorist operation has started. The promise of which Çavuşoğlu spoke was an unfettered visit by a Turkish to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). However, that promise has not been kept because of the myriad of requirements placed on the visit by China, such as predetermining the places to be visited. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

The post-November 10, 2020 geopolitical reality in the South Caucasus and the shift of balance of power have created not just an unfavourable situation for Armenia, but for Iran as well, which felt isolated from the region. Despite Tehran’s pro-active engagement towards the region, Iranian experts and politicians felt their legitimate concerns were being unheard in Moscow. Many even publicly criticized the Russian leadership for working against Iranian interests in the region by cooperating closely with Turkey.
On what issues have Russia and Iran diverged in the region?
Iranian expert on the South Caucasus Vali Kaleji, in his article “Russia and Iran Diverge in the South Caucasus,” argued that despite the similarities in Iran’s and Russia’s approaches towards the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus, after November 10, 2020, the countries have diverged when it comes to the “Zangezur Corridor,” its impact on the Armenian-Iranian border and Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan. Moreover, after the war in Ukraine, Russia distanced itself from the developments in the region leaving Armenia alone in resisting the Turkish-Azerbaijani-Israeli axis. This factor has created a security and strategic dilemma for Iran along its entire northwestern border. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

As Armenia and Azerbaijan come closer to signing an agreement by the end of 2023, and competition grows between Russia and the West to lead the process and take the prize of the main pacifier, other regional actors take steps to clarify their positions. In this context, Iran stands out as one of the primary buffers against the growing role of the West in the South Caucasus.
Being engaged with the US in continuing negotiations to revive the 2015 nuclear deal in full or at least partly, Iran is simultaneously concerned by the US efforts to reduce Russian influence in the South Caucasus. This is not because Iran loves or trusts Russia but because Iran understands the dangers of being encircled by the US, including from the north. Moreover, for Iran, US influence does not mean US military bases or US direct investments. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Russian demands to include in the peace agreement the issue of rights and security of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh may allow Armenia to take a more flexible position during the upcoming negotiations and seek to create minimally acceptable conditions for Armenians living in Nagorno Karabakh.
In recent months it appeared that the US and the EU had taken the lead in pushing forward Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiations. In May and June, the US organized two meetings of the foreign ministers with their respective teams to work on the text of the peace agreement, while the President of the European Council brought together President Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan in May and July. The Russian President organized a summit of Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders in late May 2023. However, besides the public debate between President Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan on the 'Zangezur corridor", that meeting brought no other tangible results. Given that Russia has shifted its focus to Ukraine since February 2022, the recent increase in US and the EU engagement with Armenia and Azerbaijan seemed quite natural; Russia started to lose its influence, and the West sought to use the momentum. After the Washington and Brussels meetings, there is increased talk that Armenia and Azerbaijan may sign a peace agreement by the end of 2023 due to the intensive dialogue facilitated by the West. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

Despite international pressure and sanctions, Iran has leveraged its strategic alliances with Russia and China to secure membership in the SCO, providing an additional platform to mitigate isolation and strengthen ties. This development, coupled with the potential inclusion of Saudi Arabia following its diplomatic normalization with Iran, signifies a strategic shift in Eurasian alliances with broader implications for global geopolitics and the balance of power.
On July 4, 2023, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) leaders held a virtual summit focusing on multipolarity and territorial sovereignty. A significant summit highlight was Iran’s induction into the organization after months of negotiations. Iran had been keen to join the SCO despite escalating international pressure and sanctions due to its failure to finalize a new nuclear deal and its open alignment with Russia during the Ukraine invasion. Although not officially involved in the military offensive, Iran supported Russia by providing indigenously manufactured Shaheed loitering munitions known as kamikaze drones.
Iran’s support for Russia arrived at a pivotal time, considering Russia’s tactical setbacks in Ukraine. However, this assistance placed Tehran under increased strain from Western powers, significantly impacting ongoing nuclear negotiations. Despite this, the strong partnership between Moscow and Tehran facilitated Iran’s full membership in the SCO. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

After winning re-election, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan significantly reshuffled his ministerial cabinet. Unlike in previous terms, this time, Erdogan decided to make significant changes to his cabinet while signaling upcoming reforms amid economic difficulties at home and political disputes abroad. In addressing domestic needs, the Turkish president appointed internationally respected ex-banker Mehmet Şimşek as the new minister of finance and Cevdet Yilmaz, former minister of development and deputy prime minister in charge of the economy, as vice president. Although the cabinet members are newly appointed bureaucrats, they are not completely “new faces” as they were heavily engaged in Turkish politics before their appointments. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

I had the opportunity to participate in a program organized by the “Friends for Leadership” to attend the 2023 Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum. Thousands of delegates mostly from Latin America, Africa, and Asia attended the forum alongside heads of state, diplomats, and businessmen. Interestingly, the UAE had the “special guest” status and anyone could feel its cultural, economic, and political presence in the forum. Delegates were anxious to be informed of the details of the new agreements signed between Russia and other countries, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin’s remarks and attend dozens of sessions and panels related to the BRICS, Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), International North-South Transport Corridor, and North-South trade. I had the opportunity to closely identify Russia’s post-Ukraine war foreign policy priorities, its geo-economic interests in the Middle East, and the challenges of the emerging multipolar world system. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

As the Russia – West confrontation continues without any signs of an end, many experts, academicians, and politicians seek to grasp the contours of the emerging new world order. Some believe that, in the end, a new bipolar world will emerge dominated by China and the US, while Russia will be forced to choose between these states based on the outcome of the Russia – Ukraine war. If the West can impose a strategic defeat on Russia and bring about a regime change, Russia will be in the West’s camp against China. Otherwise, the Kremlin will be a junior partner of China, supplying Beijing with cheap raw materials and getting access to Chinese funds and technologies. Others argue that the future world order will be multipolar, with no fixed alliances, and several key players will pursue temporary cooperation with each other based on short-term needs. One thing is clear: the finalization of the new world order will take years and decades, and till then, instability and strategic ambiguity will be the primary features of the world. READ MORE

By Fuad SHAHBAZOV, Baku-based independent regional security and defence analyst

Rising tensions between Iran and Afghanistan, sparked by territorial and water disputes, are at a critical juncture following a border incident resulting in deaths on both sides. While armed conflict seems unlikely due to the two nations’ relative military strength and political instability, the water scarcity problem, and the possible intervention of external actors like China underscore the necessity for diplomatic dialogue.
On May 27, 2023, a volatile situation erupted along the Iran-Afghanistan border, leading to the unfortunate deaths of two Iranian border guards and one Taliban fighter. This incident, near a border post, drastically intensified the already burgeoning tensions between these two nations Following contentious border incidents, both sides voiced solid and bitter accusations. However, several experts have interpreted this ongoing discord’s root cause as territorial and water disputes. The issue of water scarcity has steadily morphed into a significant challenge for Iran, causing friction with its neighbours. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The presidential and parliamentary elections in Turkey were perhaps the most anticipated political events of 2023. There was a feeling among politicians, experts, and academicians that the 21-year rule of Erdogan may end. Given the transition of the global order, the Russia–West confrontation, and the prominent role of Turkey in shaping the balance of power in multiple regions stretching from the Middle East to Central Asia and the Eastern Mediterranean, the foreign policy choices of Turkey are of utmost importance for all global actors.

Erdogan’s efforts to pull Turkey out from its usual role of junior partner of the US and transform the country into an independent regional player has significantly deteriorated Turkey – West relations. The US support to Kurdish forces in northeastern Syria, the purchase of Russian S-400 air defense systems, the suspicions in Turkey about potential American involvement in the July 2016 botched military coup attempt, rejection of Turkey’s request to extradite Fethullah Gülen, and Turkey’s reluctance to agree to the NATO membership of Sweden and Finland, brought US–Turkey relations to their lowest point since the end of the Cold War. Turkey’s position on the Russia – Ukraine war also did not fully satisfy the Americans. Turkey supports Ukraine economically and militarily, but Turkey rejects calls to decrease its economic relationship with Russia, while playing a crucial role simultaneously in organizing exports to Russia. READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

Israeli-Azerbaijani relations are based on two main pillars: patient and cordial political relations as well as defence cooperation and arms sales. While the former reached a more intensive level this year, with the opening of an Azerbaijani embassy in Tel Aviv in late March, the latter pillar of the relationship was well developed long before, as Israel became Azerbaijan’s largest weapons supplier.
After decades of keeping a low diplomatic profile vis-à-vis Israel, in November 2022 the Azerbaijani parliament approved a bill on opening an embassy in Tel Aviv. This was a historic decision as, until then, Azerbaijan had consistently rejected Israeli overtures to send a permanent ambassador, despite the opening of an Israeli embassy in Baku in August 1993. It took almost 30 years for Azerbaijan to reciprocate since the country’s leadership did not want to alienate other Muslim-majority states or provoke the Iranian authorities, who blamed Israel for worsening relations along the Baku-Tehran axis. However, in the wake of the 2020 signing of the Abraham Accords on diplomatic normalization between Israel and Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates, followed by the exchange of Israeli and Turkish ambassadors two years later, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev felt that the time was right to follow suit. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union have ushered in hopes of humanity's happy and harmonious future. The ideas such as "End of history" (Fukuyama, 1992) became very popular both within academic circles and policymakers. There was a widespread belief that the entire planet would live under liberal democracy, and interstate conflicts will become bad memories from history. The last decade of the 20thcentury seemed to confirm those hopes. The EU and NATO enlargement, market reforms informer socialist states, cooperative relations between Russia and the West, and the growing US –China economic cooperation have seemingly justified hopes for establishing the world united under the banner of liberal democracy. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

2023 marks the centennial of the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, when the Turkish Grand National Assembly led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk proclaimed the establishment of the republic and the abolishment of the Caliphate that ruled Ottoman Turks for six centuries. For decades, the Kemalists and military-backed governments ruled Türkiye with a secular iron hand. It wasn’t until 2002, when the conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power that Kemalists’ monopoly on power was challenged, ending decades of unstable coalition governments. AKP’s early years were relatively peaceful, as the country experienced fast economic growth and continued openness to the West. However, as the authorities began facing domestic and regional challenges, illiberal democracy started to consolidate itself in Türkiye. In 2013, protests erupted in opposition to building a shopping mall in Istanbul’s Gezi Park. The government violently cracked down on the movement and began limiting civil liberties and curtailing press freedoms. Moreover, a failed coup attempt in 2016 consolidated authoritarianism in the country. READ MORE

By Vusal GULIYEV, Visiting Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Center of Boğaziçi University

Located at a key geopolitical and geo-economic point in the Silk Road region, Azerbaijan has been a main initiator in the development of technologically advanced and economically viable trans-border logistics and transit services. This is largely due to Baku’s embrace of a wide spectrum of digitalization and innovation initiatives within the broad-based connectivity framework of the Middle Corridor Initiative (MCI) and other similar such projects. This IDD analytical policy brief will examine various aspects of this important topic as it relates to MCI.
Seizing new opportunities in the digital era whilst developing better measures to boost the digital economy and trade with embedded innovation and emerging technologies has become one of Azerbaijan’s top priorities in the past few years. In the wake of significant government-backed digital transformation efforts, special attention is now being placed on enhancing the variety of logistics services on offer, building cutting-edge infrastructure, and upgrading domestic communication systems. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The devastating earthquake in Turkey, and Armenia's decision to provide humanitarian assistance and send rescue teams, have however opened a new window of opportunity for revitalizing the stalled [normalization] process". "Turkey assessed the Armenian government's gesture positively, and the Armenian foreign minister's visit to Turkey made it possible to advance the implementation of agreements reached in 2022. And yet, "earthquake diplomacy" will not lead to short-term breakthroughs in bilateral relations.
Devastating earthquakes of 7.8 and 7.5 magnitudes struck southern Turkey on 6 February 2023. By 10 April, the death toll had passed 50,000, while the number of wounded passed 100,000. More than 12,000 buildings were destroyed, and large-scale rescue operations were underway. Besides the immense human tragedy, the earthquake had domestic and foreign policy implications for Turkey. The country faces crucial presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for 14 May. READ MORE

By Yeghia TASHJIAN, Beirut-based regional analyst and researcher, columnist, "The Armenian Weekly”

Armenians in Lebanon are a deeply institutionalized and politicized community. Given its transnational nature, the community is affected by international, regional, and local developments. For this reason, the political parties and the community leadership analyse local events and position themselves in the Lebanese political space based on local, regional, and sometimes pan-Armenian calculations or interests. Hence the community, like other transnational ethno-religious groups, absorbs from its surroundings and reacts accordingly to preserve itself from security threats. […] This policy brief will also raise a few recommendations regarding new strategies and the need to adopt a vision for the future of the community amid the wave of uncertainties surrounding Lebanon. READ MORE

By Benyamin POGHOSYAN, PhD, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The 2007-2008 world financial crisis triggered discussions about the inevitable decline of the post-Cold War unipolar order, marked by absolute US hegemony. The Arab Spring, the 2014 Ukraine crisis, the Syrian civil war, and the botched US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 contributed to the ongoing debate about the relative decline of the US and the rise of other powers. The growing influence of non-Western institutions, such as the association of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), attempts to abandon the US dollar in bilateral trade, and the establishment of alternative international financial institutions, such as the New Development Bank of BRICS and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, seemed to shatter the undisputed leadership of Western political and financial institutions and the role of the US dollar as the only global reserve currency. The growing economic and military strength of China, the more assertive foreign policy of Russia, and India’s balanced foreign policy seeking to pursue cooperative relations with the West and Russia were signs of the changing nature of international relations. READ MORE

By Eugene KOGAN, Tbilisi-based defence and security expert

Georgia borders Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Turkey. It remains a transit hub for oil and gas pipelines originating in Azerbaijan and a road hub for goods coming from Iran via Armenia to the European Union (EU), from Armenia and travelling to Russia, and from Turkey and travelling to Russia and Azerbaijan. As a result, changes that are taking place in the Caucasus due to the Russian war against Ukraine are directly affecting Georgia. Russia as a gatekeeper in the South Caucasus is less able to defend its interests in the region and that results in the ongoing skirmishes between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Iranian military exercises on the border with Azerbaijan, and reciprocal Azerbaijani-Turkish exercises. Thus far, Georgia has kept itself out of the conflict and has even tried to play the role of mediator in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but to no avail, since Georgia is not considered a powerful enough conflict mediator. READ MORE

By Nika CHITADZE, PhD, Director of the Center for International Studies, Tbilisi

At the beginning of March 2023, the Parliament of Georgia discussed and supported by the first hearing (with 76 votes) two draft laws regarding the “agents of foreign influence”. The discussion took place against the background of fierce protests both inside and outside the Parliament building. The bills were submitted by the political party “People’s Power”, which is a satellite of the Georgian Dream ruling party. Initially, the draft law “On transparency of foreign influence” was registered in the Parliament. To “ensure transparency”, the new law required the registration of non-entrepreneurial (non-commercial) legal entities and media means which received more than 20% of their income from abroad as “agents of foreign influence”. READ MORE